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1. MOTIVATION AND STRUCTURE 
International relocation of production to strengthen their competitive advantage has 
become a major strategic option for firms, and raises much attention in public debate 
as well as in academia (Sleuwaegen & Pennings, 2006). According to surveys of 
German firms, a temporary peak in international relocation was reached in the year of 
2003, when every fourth firm was planning to invest in foreign production capacities 
(Kinkel & Maloca, 2009). The underlying motivations for relocating production 
abroad are manifold. First, a particular location may offer demand or supply markets 
that are attractive for foreign investors. In that sense, production subsidiaries might be 
established to meet local demand or to enable access to valuable production resources 
such as raw materials or low cost labor. Secondly, foreign production affiliates can be 
established in order to increase the efficiency of production processes across an 
integrated production system (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). 
Rising international economic integration of firms’ business activities reduces the 
importance of local production in order to serve demand on site (Mucchielli & Saucier, 
1997). Further, convergence of customers’ needs and the potential to modularize 
products favor internationally dispersed production processes that enable the most 
efficient allocation of products that are sold on the world market. However, the 
external cost conditions that determine efficient configuration of production activities 
are not fixed. For that reason, multinational corporations may build flexibility into 
their production configuration, allowing them to react to uncertain external 
developments (Buckley & Casson, 1998). 
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The concept of operational flexibility (Kogut, 1983) delivers a theoretical framework 
that encompasses the potential benefits of maintaining an international network of 
production subsidiaries in order to obtain the flexibility to manufacture on the most 
efficient scale. By shifting activities within that network in response to current cost 
developments, firms can exploit arbitrage and leverage opportunities (Kogut, 1985). 
To preserve efficient production processes, firms can adjust labor capacity across their 
production locations in accordance with their respective labor cost developments. 
However, the international production network has to exhibit a configuration that 
allows an efficient exploitation of operational flexibility. If the foreign locations 
within a production network show sub-optimal conditions for an internationally 
dispersed production process, the portfolio of production locations has to be 
reconfigured by adding new or withdrawing existing sites. 
The goal of this study is to analyse the characteristics of the current configuration of 
an international production network that determine the need to expand or contract that 
network in order to provide operational flexibility. In addition to the question of a 
network’s size, different qualitative characteristics of the portfolio’s locations and the 
network as a whole are considered. Further, the study aims to clarify the issue of 
whether a network reconfiguration that improves the efficiency of a multinational 
production system leads to higher performance of a firm’s international activities. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. In the second chapter, we will 
introduce the concept of operational flexibility in detail and present extant empirical 
findings on the performance effects of maintaining operational flexibility, before we 
discuss which factors determine the flexibility potential of an international network of 
production subsidiaries. 
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In chapter three, we will analyse those characteristics of the existing international 
network of production subsidiaries that lead to a firm’s decision to reconfigure the 
network by expanding it. The results of empirical analysis indicate that cost and 
flexibility shortcomings of the existing production network will increase the 
propensity to establish another production site abroad. Further, the findings suggest 
that investors choose locations for new production sites that will improve the 
efficiency of the network. 
In the fourth chapter, we will investigate the factors influencing the propensity to 
withdraw from a location of the international production network as an alternative 
strategy for reconfiguring a production system. The empirical analysis reveals that 
firms tend to keep locations which show adverse cost developments if the location 
offers flexibility to react to those developments by shifting capacity. Adverse cost 
developments in the remaining countries of the network will deter investors from 
leaving the focal location. 
Performance effects of reconfiguring an international production network are analysed 
in chapter five. Expanding or contracting a multinational network is expected to 
improve performance if it leads to a rise in the average ability to shift activities across 
locations. The empirical findings support this notion. Reconfiguration decisions that 
lead to a higher opportunity to adjust capacities as well as to lower the costs of 
capacity shifting will benefit firms in the short-run. Sub-analyses that consider only 
expanding or contracting decisions, respectively, further stress the importance of 
flexibility within international production networks. Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure 
of the empirical analysis. 
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the empirical analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
The sixth and last chapter concludes the study by integrating its findings. Being aware 
of the study’s limitations, we will indicate the implications for firms and governments 
as well as perspectives for future research. 
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2. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
2.1 Traditional approaches on international production 
There are several theoretical approaches that deliver alternative explanations of a 
firm’s decision to invest in foreign production sites. A concept that attracts much 
attention in literature is the eclectic paradigm developed by John Dunning (e.g., 
Dunning, 1981). Drawing on the theory of monopolistic advantages (Hymer, 1976; 
Kindleberger, 1969), internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976), and location 
factors, firms are supposed to invest in production subsidiaries abroad if they possess 
ownership-specific advantages, are better able to exploit them by themselves rather 
than using market mechanisms (internalization advantages), and if the foreign location 
offers favorable cost conditions (location-specific advantages). A dynamic approach 
to the decision to invest in foreign production sites is offered by the stage model put 
forward by Uppsala school (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). It models the sequence of 
internationalization steps of a multinational corporation (MNC) via a learning process. 
According to the Uppsala approach, firms will invest in production subsidiaries 
abroad after they have gained experience in the particular market through previous 
investments in sales subsidiaries. Both concepts, however, view investments in 
foreign production affiliates as motivated by the intention to meet local demand. 
Therefore, these concepts are less suitable for analyzing the configuration of a 
multinational production network, which is established in order to generate efficiency 
in the overall production system. 
Location factors are important determinants of an investor’s decision to engage in 
production activities in a particular country. Literature stresses the absolute 
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advantages of individual locations, e. g. legal, political, or macroeconomic conditions, 
since they determine the attractiveness of a location as a destination for inward foreign 
direct investments (Enright, 2009; Flores & Aguilera, 2007). However, external 
conditions that determine a location’s appropriateness as a production location are 
dynamic rather than fixed. Drawing on location factors at a given point of time 
neglects possible future developments that might lead to a different assessment of a 
location’s qualities. Further, the evaluation of location factors also depends on 
characteristics of the individual parent firm and interrelations with other locations of a 
firm’s portfolio. Location factors alone are therefore not sufficient to explain an 
MNC’s efficient configuration of production activities. 
A more comprehensive framework for explaining the determinants that influence an 
efficient configuration of a multinational production system is provided by the 
concept of operational flexibility. Departing from previous approaches, investments in 
foreign affiliates should be understood from the perspective of “sequential flows 
stemming from the advantages of flexibility of a multinational system” (Kogut, 1983). 
 
2.2 International production from the perspective of operational 
 flexibility 
2.2.1 Concept of operational flexibility 
Kogut (1983) criticizes theoretical approaches that stress national factors and market 
imperfections as motivation for foreign direct investment (FDI) and, instead, 
advocates viewing it as a process of sequential allocation decisions within a 
multinational network. Being internationally active, provides firms with the flexibility 
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to reduce the costs of operating in an uncertain world and is the primary advantage of 
MNCs as differentiated from national corporations in Kogut’s view. The advantages 
of a multinational system can be subsumed under two categories: arbitrage and 
leverage opportunities (Kogut, 1985). 
Arbitrage opportunities are given in the first place by the benefits of multinational 
production shifting. Firms may react to changed cost conditions of locally sourced 
inputs that are not priced at the world market – labor being probably the most 
important factor – by shifting production capacities across countries. Whereas labor 
costs may change themselves, national labor costs have to be judged differently due to 
exchange rate movements between countries. However, the benefits of shifting 
capacity have to be weighed against the costs in terms of loss in economies of scale in 
an individual plant and of holding excess capacity. Further, the degree to which labor 
costs are fixed or variable due to national layoff restrictions or overtime constraints 
has to be considered. 
A second arbitrage opportunity is tax minimization within the MNC. Since countries 
exhibit different tax regimes, an MNC has the opportunity to minimize its tax bill 
through adjustment of transfer prices and choice of remittance channels. Being present 
in different countries allows the firm, e. g. by under- or over-evaluating internally 
transferred intangibles, to shift profits to subsidiaries in low tax countries. Thirdly, 
since countries often compete for inward FDI, firms can benefit from financial 
investment incentives such as subsidies, tax holidays, or guaranteed loans. Finally, 
firms may obtain advantages through their international presence in terms of 
information arbitrage. This information may concern matching sellers and buyers or 
finding innovations on product and process developments. 
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Leverage opportunities are offered by a higher bargaining power towards customers, 
competitors, and governments. Multinational firms may, for example, cross-subsidize 
their products internationally in order to carry out aggressive price cutting strategies in 
certain foreign markets or to counter political risks by relocating activities to other 
countries of a multinational network when negotiations with governments fail. 
Benefiting from internationalization through operational flexibility, however, requires 
that the firm possess the managerial skills and organizational resources to coordinate 
its activities in response to changing external conditions (Kogut, 1985). Therefore, not 
all firms may be aware of and able to exploit the potential that is offered by 
international arbitrage and leverage opportunities. Further, the benefits of operational 
flexibility are contingent on factors outside the firm. Several studies model the effects 
of different external conditions that impact the value of maintaining and exploiting 
operational flexibility. 
Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) develop a stochastic dynamic programming model for 
evaluating an MNC’s benefits of maintaining production sites in two countries, when 
there is uncertainty in the fluctuation of real exchange rates between the two locations. 
The model shows that the value of having the option of shifting production across 
both locations, in order to minimize total production costs, is greater in periods of 
higher volatility of exchange rates. Huchzermeier and Cohen (1996) demonstrate that 
the costs of adjustment of product design and supply chain configuration in the 
foreign locations determine the net benefits of a flexible system to cope with exchange 
rate fluctuations. Similarly, Dasu and Li (1997) model the influence of several 
location-specific factor costs with different cost functions and deliver a numerical 
solution on when and how firms should alter production quantities between the plants. 
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Additional studies propose a variety of specific solutions for optimal configurations of 
international production planning under uncertain cost developments (e.g., Mello, 
Parsons, & Triantis, 1995; Nembhard, Shi, & Aktan, 2005). From a theoretical 
perspective, all these studies stress the importance of possessing flexibility because of 
changing external cost conditions. International business research has also delivered 
empirical evidence that MNCs actually make use of the potential for operational 
flexibility by adjusting their international activities according to changed cost 
conditions. 
Kogut and Chang (1996) investigate the role of exchange rate movements in 
subsequent investments of 95 Japanese electronics firms within the U.S. The findings 
suggest that in years when the yen depreciates vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, that is when 
imports to the U.S. become relatively more competitive, firms defer further 
investments in production affiliates and rather serve the U.S. market via their sales 
subsidiaries. Rangan (1998) analyses home-content levels of U.S. affiliates of foreign 
firms and of foreign affiliates of U.S. firms on industry-aggregated level. The results 
reveal that firms adjust their input mix of local and foreign components according to 
exchange rate movements between the respective countries. However, the strength of 
reaction is rather moderate; for example, U.S. firms reacted to a 40 percent 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the Deutsche mark (between 1985 and 1989) 
with an increase of less than two percentage points in the  U.S. content of products 
sold in German affiliates. U.S. affiliates of German firms reduced German content in 
products sold by less than four percentage points. The two studies deliver empirical 
evidence that MNCs respond to changing cost conditions that are caused by exchange 
rate movements, by adjusting their international production activities. The analyses, 
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however, only incorporate two countries, the home and a foreign market, rather than a 
network of internationally dispersed affiliates. Further, market motives seem to 
dominate over efficiency considerations as the driving factors for resource 
deployment decisions in the specific empirical environments. 
Widening the network perspective to a greater set of locations, Belderbos and Zou 
(2007) investigate the influence of labor costs on capacity adjustment decisions within 
a network of foreign production subsidiaries. Drawing on a sample of manufacturing 
affiliates of 412 Japanese investors in nine Asian countries, they find that labor cost 
growth in the focal location has a significant negative influence, whereas labor cost 
growth in the remaining countries of the network has a significant positive influence 
on the employment growth in a particular country. MNCs obviously also exploit the 
flexibility potential offered by a multinational network by adjusting labor capacity 
according to the wage developments within a set of several host countries. Chung et al. 
(2010) demonstrate with a similar sample (manufacturing subsidiaries of 471 Japanese 
investors in five Asian countries) that MNCs make use of operational flexibility by an 
increased number of employees and a higher sales volume when the external 
conditions are uncertain. 
 
2.2.2 Performance effects of operational flexibility 
Besides investigating the conditions that determine the exploitation of operational 
flexibility, extant research also analysed the benefits of maintaining operational 
flexibility in terms of performance effects to the MNC. Benefits of multinationality 
due to operational flexibility have been acknowledged by a large number of studies 
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that aim at revealing the performance outcomes of internationalization (Pantzalis, 
2001; Tallman & Li, 1996; Thomas & Eden, 2004). Empirical studies that employ 
commonly used measures of multinationality such as the ratio of foreign assets to total 
assets (Miller & Reuer, 1998), the spread of activities across foreign locations (Kim, 
Hwang, & Burgers, 1993), or composite internationalization measures (Lu & Beamish, 
2004) to detect performance effects of operational flexibility, however, may fail to 
ascribe performance outcomes of internationalization unambiguously to operational 
flexibility. Rather, other potential benefits of multinationality, for example, economies 
of scale or access to valuable resources may be superimposed on the effects of 
operational flexibility. 
Allen and Pantzalis (1996) introduced a measurement concept that differentiates the 
international configuration into breadth (number of host countries) and depth (ratio of 
sum of subsidiaries in the two host countries with the largest number of subsidiaries to 
total number of foreign subsidiaries). The authors define high (low) breadth as being 
active in more (equal or less) than 10 countries and high (low) depth as having more 
(equal or less) than 25 % of subsidiaries in the two countries with most subsidiaries. 
MNCs are categorized into four groups according to their breadth/depth configuration 
(high breadth/high depth, high breadth/low depth, low breadth/high depth, low 
breadth/low depth). The empirical analysis of 363 MNCs based in the U.S. reveals 
that firms with a high breadth and low depth configuration outperform domestic firms 
as well as MNCs with other configurations in terms of higher market valuation. These 
results are interpreted as support for the notion that high breadth offers greater 
potential of operational flexibility, whereas high depth leads to higher agency costs of 
managing extensive multinational networks. Tang and Tikoo (1999) replicate the 
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findings of Allen and Pantzalis with a sample of 589 U.S. based manufacturing MNCs 
and confirm that a configuration of high breadth and low depth is favored by the stock 
market over alternative configurations. Recently, Lee and Makhija (2009) followed 
this methodology when extending the breadth/depth model by an explicit 
consideration of different sources of exogenous uncertainty on the market valuation of 
operational flexibility. The market valuation effects of different configurations are 
tested on a panel of 270 Korean firms over a period of 16 years. Two sources of 
uncertainty are considered: domestic uncertainty (variance of the weekly Korean stock 
market index) and exchange rate uncertainty (variance of monthly exchange rates 
between the Korean won and the U.S. dollar). The findings indicate that under 
conditions of domestic uncertainty, the stock market favors international 
configurations with high breadth and low depth. Under conditions of exchange rate 
uncertainty, on the other hand, firms with low breadth and low depth gain higher 
valuations in comparison to alternative configurations. Operational flexibility, hence, 
seems to offer an appropriate means of reacting flexibly to uncertain economic 
developments in the home market rather than to exchange rate fluctuations, which can 
be hedged by firms without being present in a larger number of foreign markets. 
Drawing on the number of host countries to quantify the potential benefits of 
operational flexibility, however, delivers not only linear positive results. Tong and 
Reuer (2007) argue that with rising number of host countries, the advantages of 
operational flexibility lead to decreasing marginal returns. Being active in a large 
number of host countries rather increases the coordination costs of international 
activities, which may finally outweigh the benefits and will reveal negative 
performance outcomes. Using a sample of U.S. based manufacturing firms, the 
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authors find support for their notion by a curvilinear relationship between the number 
of host countries and downside risk (which denotes return on assets and equity below 
industry average, respectively). With a rising number of host countries, downside risk 
will first decrease and then increase. Congruent findings were delivered by Chung, Lu, 
and Beamish (2008) with a sample of Japanese MNCs’ subsidiaries in Asia. Their 
results reveal that the probability of subsidiaries being profitable will first increase 
and then decrease with rising number of countries. Reuer and Leiblein (2000), despite 
expecting a positive effect of the number of host countries on firm performance, 
cannot find a significant influence when investigating international joint venture 
activities of a sample of manufacturing firms based in the U.S. The authors conclude 
that in spite of the promise of operating flexibly, reality shows firms with apparently 
limited capabilities for managing international investments as options. Other studies 
even detect a significant negative influence of the number of host countries on firm 
performance (Ogasavara & Hoshino, 2009; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001) or a 
performance influence that is at first decreasing and then increasing with a rising 
number of countries (Lu & Beamish, 2001). 
Basically, the number of host countries seems to be a suitable measure for quantifying 
a firm’s potential to shift production capacity across borders in response to changed 
cost conditions. However, the divergent empirical findings on the performance 
outcomes of possessing operational flexibility point to the need for analysing the 
conditions that enable a firm to exploit operational flexibility efficiently in more detail. 
Qualitative properties of the network rather than the size alone seem to determine the 
degree to which an MNC can benefit from international production shifting. As a next 
step, we will describe which characteristics of the individual production affiliate, as 
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well as of the production network as a whole, influence the efficient exploitation of 
operational flexibility. 
 
2.2.3 Factors determining the efficient exploitation of operational flexibility 
A multinational network of production subsidiaries provides firms with the 
opportunity to shift production capacities in response to changing external conditions. 
Production shifting across locations, however, is associated with costs (Kogut & 
Kulatilaka, 1994). Besides additional set-up costs, loss of optimal capital utilization 
etc. that accrue every time a firm alters production capacities across its subsidiaries, 
the characteristics of the individual production site within an international network 
lead to specific costs of shifting for the MNC. Those costs are influenced by factors 
inside and outside the production affiliate. 
Factors inside the production subsidiary that determine the efficiency of allocating 
resources across countries can be influenced by the MNC up to a certain degree. 
Insufficient technical or organizational characteristics of a particular foreign 
production affiliate, however, may be revealed just at the moment when capacities are 
to be shifted. Technically, the individual subsidiary is required to maintain product 
lines that can be shared with their counterparts in other countries (Kogut, 1985). On 
an organizational level, a subsidiary’s managers must be willing and able to enforce 
employment reductions, which may represent lower power of the affiliate’s 
management or may lead to serious resistance of employees within the subsidiary (e.g., 
Blazejewski, 2009). Furthermore, the flexibility to decide on capacity adjustments 
might be lower when the investor does not have the full power to make decisions, i. e. 
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the subsidiary is not wholly-owned but is a joint venture with a local partner who has 
to agree to allocation decisions in the focal market (Tong & Reuer, 2007). 
Factors outside the production affiliate are given, for example, by political and social 
institutions or regulatory frameworks in a host country. Since capacity adjustments 
impact the number of people employed in a location, national labor market regulations 
such as overtime constraints, employee layoff, as well as the power of labor unions 
are crucial to the actual costs that arise from resource allocation decisions. Even 
though the impact of national labor market regulations on MNC behavior attracts 
rising attention in international business research (Chacar, Newburry, & Vissa, 2010; 
Pajunen, 2008), empirical evidence on the influence on international production-
shifting practices is missing to date. As a first approach, Pull (2008) argues that U.S. 
based firms which are facing volatile product demand (and therefore have to adjust 
production capacity regularly) prefer the U.K. as a business location over Germany 
since the British labor law is more flexible than the German one. The results of a 
survey covering 52 firms, however, do not empirically support this notion. 
Another aspect is the average qualification level in a country. Shifting production 
capacities across locations requires employees to adapt to changing production 
processes. A well-qualified workforce in the individual location offers more flexibility 
to react to changing demands and causes less costs for an altered production schedule. 
Several studies investigate the qualification of the workforce as a determinant for 
location choice of foreign investors (Geishecker, Goerg, & Munch, 2010; Pull, 2008). 
Empirical evidence on its influence on the efficiency of international shifting activities 
of firms, however, still has to be provided. 
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A location’s appropriateness as a production site within an international network, 
however, also depends on its relative fit to the other locations of the investor’s 
portfolio. Production locations which are geographically widely spread generate 
higher costs of transportation of intermediate or final goods when transferred across 
locations. Those costs might urge firms to choose locations in one geographic region 
rather than across all regions of the world (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Further, 
countries exhibit different trade regulations, e. g. tariffs, quotas, import, and export 
restrictions, which are specific to the type of product, shipment quantity, and origin or 
destination, respectively. MNCs that shift activities across their foreign locations have 
to consider the costs that are accrued when goods pass borders (Buckley & Casson, 
1998). As a consequence, firms may choose countries within a certain area that offers 
favorable conditions such as regional free trade areas or common markets. 
Higher costs of production shifting may also arise if the infrastructure of a location is 
very different or incompatible to the remaining sites of the network. Technical 
infrastructure should allow plants to manufacture outputs of similar quality as well as 
to reduce costs of information processing via similar standards of information 
technology, for example, availability of internet services etc. (Buckley & Casson, 
1998). Transport infrastructure in form of rail, roads, or airports should ensure an easy 
interconnection of a production network’s different sites (Buckley & Casson, 1998). 
Further, coordination within a network will induce higher costs when the involved 
countries are culturally very different. Problems may occur due to different languages, 
social norms, or working and business cultures (e.g., Hofstede, 1980). Studies have 
shown that cultural difference within an international network might lower the 
performance of business activities (Hutzschenreuter & Voll, 2008; Tong & Reuer, 
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2007). 
Concerning production cost conditions, however, homogeneity among the locations of 
a production network is not useful. Earlier studies revealed that heterogeneity within a 
portfolio of host countries can be decisive for a firm’s success (Goerzen & Beamish, 
2003; Pantzalis, 2001) since it accounts for an MNC’s ability to balance economic 
(demand) risks. Firms that establish an international production network in order to 
obtain operational flexibility should ensure that they can balance risks of labor cost 
developments. Cost developments in the different locations should be dissimilar, i. e. 
production costs must not change in parallel. If they do, the MNC does not have the 
alternative of responding to changed cost conditions in a location with capacity 
shifting to another location. 
Belderbos and Zou (2009) analyse diversity of cost developments within international 
production networks in order to identify redundant locations within that network. The 
study draws on correlations of the monthly real exchange rates of a focal country and 
the other host countries within the network. The analysis discloses that subsidiaries in 
countries that have a strong correlation with exchange rate developments in the other 
locations of the network seem not to offer a sufficient alternative for shifting and are 
more likely to be divested. Building on those findings, Chung et al. (2010) present 
similar results. The study extends the measurement of exchange rate correlations by a 
focal country’s correlation of exchange rate developments with exchange rate 
developments of all countries in the world. Further, those correlations are calculated 
as year-to-year change which delivers a variable with varying values during the 
observation period. The empirical results support the assumption that foreign 
subsidiaries which are established for the purpose of across-country flexibility (as 
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indicated by the export vs. local sales ratio), are less likely to be expanded, both in 
terms of employees and sales, when they are located in countries that feature high 
redundancy of exchange rate developments. 
The results of both the above studies substantiate the notion that countries of a 
multinational production network must feature diversity in cost developments in order 
to provide valuable options for shifting production capacity within the network. 
Exchange rates, however, are not the only source of volatility of cost developments. 
Depending on the configuration of a multinational network, for example, in regions 
with a dominant or single currency such as the euro area, diversity of national labor 
cost developments themselves may have a much stronger influence on cost conditions 
than exchange rates. Corresponding empirical results on the influence of diversity of 
labor cost developments are missing to date, which seems partly due to the lack of 
adequate data (Belderbos & Zou, 2009). 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
Traditional theoretical approaches stress characteristics of the individual foreign 
location as determinants of a firm’s decision to establish a production subsidiary. 
Since firms are increasingly competing on the world market, the need to produce on 
most efficient scale under volatile external cost conditions has become an important 
motivation for firms to invest in an integrated multinational production network 
(Buckley & Casson, 1998). Maintaining an international production network provides 
firms with operational flexibility to shift production capacity according to changing 
cost developments (Kogut, 1985). 
 19
Extant research has demonstrated that MNCs actually make use of the flexibility 
potential that is offered by a multinational network. Multinational firms were found to 
adjust production processes according to exchange rate movements (Rangan, 1998) 
and changes in labor costs (Belderbos & Zou, 2007). In line with the argument that 
this flexibility to react to volatile cost developments rises with network size, several 
studies revealed that the number of foreign locations of an investor’s portfolio is 
positively associated with firm performance (Allen & Pantzalis, 1996; Tang & Tikoo, 
1999). 
However, the size of a production network is not the only factor that determines a 
firm’s ability to exploit the potential of operational flexibility. On the one hand, the 
single locations of the network offer a specific flexibility to shift production capacities, 
for example, in terms of labor market regulations. On the other hand, a location’s fit 
within the portfolio determines the flexibility of capacity adjustments, for example 
through its contribution to diversity of cost developments within the network. MNCs 
that intend to shift production capacities across the locations of their production 
network may find that the existing network does not reveal the desired level of 
flexibility. In that case, firms can reconfigure their international production activities 
by establishing new or withdrawing existing locations from the portfolio. These 
reconfiguration decisions that enhance the flexibility to adjust production processes 
within an international production network might lead to an improved performance of 
international activities rather than the size of the network. 
In the next chapter of this study we will analyse to what extent cost and flexibility 
characteristics of the current set of foreign locations will induce investors to enlarge 
the production network by an additional foreign production site. Decisions to 
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withdraw locations from the network are analysed in chapter four, before the 
performance effects of an MNC’s decision to reconfigure its international production 
network are investigated in chapter five. 
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3. EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION 
 NETWORKS 
3.1 Research context 
Most of the research on international production in accordance with the traditional 
theories of internationalization such as Johanson and Vahlne (1977) or Dunning 
(1988) centers on the question of whether multinational corporations establish 
production subsidiaries in foreign markets. Typical motives of expanding production 
to foreign markets are reducing transaction and transportation costs, adapting products 
to local tastes, or circumventing trade barriers (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). However, 
if foreign direct investments are supposed to increase the efficiency of the corporate 
production system rather than improve the access to a particular market, the decision-
maker’s scope widens from the potential target location to the whole set of production 
locations maintained by he firm. In fact, the basic decision to complement the 
production network may precede the decision to choose a certain location. This 
chapter seeks to explain the decision to establish a new production subsidiary as a 
consequence of cost and flexibility shortcomings of the existing network of 
production units and to demonstrate that firms choose a location that compensates for 
those deficiencies. Under these circumstances, the quality of production locations is 
path-dependent and company-specific. 
The efficiency improvement contributed by an additional plant needs to be viewed in 
a dynamic perspective. Only few studies have examined the effects of prior 
international investments on the establishment of new foreign subsidiaries in a time-
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series approach. Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) find that a firm’s competitive 
advantage and diversification as well as its cultural distance to the host country 
influence the entry mode of subsequent investments (greenfield vs. joint venture or 
acquisition). After Davidson (1980), Kogut and Chang (1996) show that MNCs tend 
to invest in countries they have entered before. Delios and Henisz (2003) reveal that 
experience from other foreign countries also increases the probability of further 
foreign direct investments. Tan and Vertinsky (1996) analyse the timing of subsequent 
market entries and identify network economies as another theoretical explanation for 
the positive influence of prior entries. They also mention the ability to shift production 
among plants in different locations. However, they do not elaborate this argument and 
do not provide empirical evidence. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: The theory section develops a 
model that incorporates the net present value of the existing production network and 
the value that is offered by the flexibility to react to factor cost changes. The third 
section describes the empirical research design; the fourth section presents the results. 
A discussion of the findings, including the limitations of this analysis as well as 
implications for management and future research, conclude the chapter. 
 
3.2 Theoretical development 
International diversification can be an appropriate strategy to cope with uncertainties 
of local production conditions such as labor market developments, institutional 
regulations, or exchange rate fluctuations. By building an international network of 
subsidiaries, the MNC creates operational flexibility and gains the ability to react to 
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changes in uncertain external developments by production shifting (Kogut, 1985). 
The opportunity to shift production internationally requires manufacturing to be 
spread over multiple locations. Experience from earlier international entries facilitates 
the establishment of new subsidiaries (Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001; Delios & Henisz, 
2003; Henisz & Delios, 2001). Even though additional subsidiaries boost the cost of 
coordination (Berry, 2006; Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999) and may outweigh the 
positive influence of experience, the empirical findings reveal a positive relationship 
between the number of earlier entries and the propensity to commit additional 
investments. 
Extant findings on additional investments refer to foreign subsidiaries in general. 
Regarding international production, Tong and Reuer (2007) stress the benefits of 
operational flexibility provided by a multiplicity of host countries. The profit potential 
of operational flexibility increases as the international production network grows. 
However, operational flexibility yields decreasing marginal returns to network size 
(Chung, Lu, & Beamish, 2008). Due to the diminishing contributions of additional 
investments to operational flexibility and learning, the coordination costs, which 
increase rapidly in an international production network, are likely to finally override 
the positive effects. Therefore we predict a non-linear rather than a monotonously 
positive influence of network size on the establishment of a new production subsidiary. 
Hypothesis 3.1: As the number of countries used as production locations 
rises, the propensity to establish an additional production subsidiary will 
first increase and then decrease. 
Besides its sheer size, the utility of a production network will be influenced by its cost 
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and flexibility characteristics under uncertain environmental conditions. Differing 
from the study by Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) that accounts for the value of 
flexibility under exchange rate fluctuations, we shed light on the impact of factor cost 
developments in different countries. MNCs benefit from arbitrage opportunities 
presented by the cost differences of locally sourced inputs that are not priced in world 
markets, above all labor (Kogut, 1985). Belderbos and Zou (2007) show that labor 
cost changes have an influence on capacity adjustments in international production. 
We analyse the value V of a network of international production subsidiaries to derive 
the need for a new subsidiary as a complement for improving the existing network. 
From an investment perspective, the value of a production network is given by its net 
present value NPV. From a strategic viewpoint, the value holds a second component: 
A set of subsidiaries that allows for responding profitably to the realization of 
uncertain events by shifting production within the network provides a value F from 
operational flexibility (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994) 
FNPVV  . 
The production network is exposed to labor cost developments in various countries, 
which may affect the cost of production. Productivity can be influenced by the MNC 
through technology and training, thus cost-efficient production is also possible in 
high-wage countries (Mucchielli & Saucier, 1997). However, at an attained level of 
productivity, increasing labor costs erode the net present value NPV of the production 
network. If cost savings in the existing locations do not suffice to recover production 
efficiency, the MNC is prone to consider different locations as complements and 
maybe – in the long run – as substitutes for those locations (Belderbos & Zou, 2006). 
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Accordingly, we assume that rising labor costs in the existing locations will encourage 
MNCs to expand their international production networks by a new affiliate. 
Hypothesis 3.2a: Rising labor cost in the existing network of production 
subsidiaries increases the propensity to establish an additional production 
subsidiary. 
As the MNC responds to labor cost disadvantages of its existing production network, 
it will place the investment in a location that helps alleviate the rise in labor costs and 
thereby increase the net present value of the network. 
Hypothesis 3.2b: The location chosen for an additional production 
subsidiary contributes to reducing the labor cost growth of the network of 
production subsidiaries. 
Uncertainties in the developments of labor costs within an international network of 
production facilities make the choice of efficient manufacturing technologies and the 
design of cost-minimizing production processes difficult (de Meza & van der Ploeg, 
1987). Labor cost volatility leads to an extra discount on the cash flows that are going 
to be generated by the existing production sites and decreases the net present value 
NPV. Alternative locations may have more stable labor costs. We therefore expect that 
uncertain wage developments urge MNCs to complement their international 
production system by a new investment. 
Hypothesis 3.3a: Uncertainty of labor costs in the existing network of 
production subsidiaries increases the propensity to establish an additional 
production subsidiary. 
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Facing labor cost uncertainty in the existing production network, the MNC will 
choose a location that strengthens the net present value of the production network 
through more predictable labor costs. 
Hypothesis 3.3b: The location chosen for an additional production 
subsidiary contributes to reducing the labor cost uncertainty of the 
network of production subsidiaries. 
Changing environmental conditions are less critical to the MNC if it is possible to 
balance the related movements. When production costs are uncertain, it is valuable to 
have an across-country option to shift production (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). 
However, Chung et al. (2010) show that MNCs do not shift production internationally 
if macro-economic conditions among subsidiary locations are redundant, i. e. 
environments change in parallel. A high flexibility value F of a network of production 
subsidiaries is based on two necessary conditions. The first factor driving the value of 
flexibility is the need to operate flexibly, which originates from the uncertainty of 
labor cost developments within the established production locations. The second 
factor is the opportunity to operate flexibly, which is provided by the diversity of 
labor cost developments across the established production locations. If the flexibility 
value of the production network is high due to high uncertainty and high diversity of 
labor cost developments, the MNC is likely to maintain the present network and shift 
production across countries from locations with rising labor costs to locations with 
falling labor costs. Thus, we expect that 
Hypothesis 3.4a: Under high uncertainty of labor costs, the diversity of 
labor cost developments in the existing network of production subsidiaries 
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reduces the propensity to establish an additional production subsidiary. 
If the flexibility value F of the existing production network is unsatisfactory, the 
MNC may consider establishing a new production site. Establishing a new site can 
boost the flexibility value of the network F by an increase in uncertainty or an 
increase in diversity. Locations with uncertain labor costs are undesirable as they 
create the need rather than the opportunity to be flexible and, in addition, decrease the 
net present value NPV of the network. By contrast, it seems likely that MNCs choose 
a location featuring a labor cost development which is different from the existing 
locations. 
Hypothesis 3.4b: The location chosen for an additional production 
subsidiary contributes to increasing the diversity of labor cost 
developments of the network of production subsidiaries. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the propositions of Hypotheses 3.1, 3.2a, 3.3a, and 3.4a. Since 
Hypotheses 3.2b, 3.3b, and 3.4b do not draw on the same dependent variable, we will 
not summarize them in a graph. 
 
Figure 3.1: Illustration of hypotheses on the propensity to establish a new subsidiary 
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3.3 Empirical methods 
3.3.1 Data 
The Central Bank of Germany maintains a database that comprises anonymous 
information about all foreign direct investment objects of German parent firms – 
including the German parent firms held by foreign investors – above a balance sheet 
total of currently € 3 million. The reports include balance sheets, the stock of foreign 
direct investment, and other characteristics of the foreign subsidiaries. They are 
available as panel data on a yearly basis and are assigned to investors by consistent 
identification numbers from 1996 on; new entries can be identified starting in 1997. 
For the present analysis, we closed the data set with definite figures from 2006 and 
preliminary figures from 2007. 
The investors and investment objects in the database are classified by industry codes. 
As sales subsidiaries are classified as trading companies, we can filter out the 
production affiliates of manufacturing firms. Production shifting causes a considerable 
effort in adapting an MNC’s value chain and involves additional transportation and 
coordination costs. A smaller distance facilitates earning the benefits of operational 
flexibility (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Following Belderbos and Zou (2007), we limit 
the analysis of production subsidiaries to one geographical region. As Europe is the 
most relevant production region of German MNCs accounting for 56 % of their 
foreign production, our investigation targets European production locations. Due to 
the euro as a common currency and its influence on the currencies of European 
countries outside the euro zone, exchange rate fluctuations play a minor role in the 
European region (ECB, 2007). However, there is a remarkable diversity of labor cost 
developments. 
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Starting in 2002, the Central Bank added detailed information about the investors, 
which is valuable for the study. For the longest possible observation period with full 
data availability, we focus on the first establishment of a production affiliate between 
2002 and 2007 (if it occurs) after the last establishment of such an entity since 1997. 
Investment objects with a return on sales below -1000 % or above 1000 % were 
excluded from the analysis as outliers. To avoid a bias from in-country firm 
restructuring, we did not consider the establishment of subsidiaries that compensated 
for subsidiary closures in the same country and year. However, in order to treat new 
investments without prejudice, we did not eliminate the establishment of sites in those 
countries which had been chosen as production locations by the MNC beforehand. We 
finally obtained a panel of 352 investors. 
Besides the firm-level data of the German Central Bank we included country-level 
data in our analysis. The macroeconomic data were obtained from the World Bank. 
Data on national labor costs were taken from statistical reports of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO). 
 
3.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable new subsidiary takes the value one in the year in which an 
investor establishes an additional production subsidiary abroad, and zero otherwise. 
Within the period between 2002 and 2007, 245 of the 352 investors established a new 
subsidiary. 
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Independent variables 
Operational flexibility requires maintaining multiple production locations. Previous 
studies use the number of host countries as an indicator of operational flexibility 
(Reuer & Leiblein, 2000; Tallman & Li, 1996). Accordingly, we quantify the potential 
of a foreign production network to provide operational flexibility by the number of 
countries (NOC) in which an investor maintains production subsidiaries. 
We expect to find an impact of changing factor prices in the existing production 
locations on the decision to make an additional investment. Data on national wages 
were taken from ILO’s Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) databank, 5th 
edition (2007). To calculate labor cost development, we use the real manufacturing 
wage index as a basis, which is the nominal wages index corrected for changes in 
purchasing power measured by the consumer price index (100 * nominal wage 
index/consumer price index). We subtract the wage index of the previous year from 
the wage index of the present year and calculate the mean across all existing 
production locations of the MNC in a year. 
We also draw on the ILO real manufacturing wage index to measure uncertainty of 
labor costs. In the same way as earlier studies that incorporate uncertainty by the 
volatility of a macroeconomic indicator (Campa, 2004; Folta & O'Brien, 2004), we 
use an autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) process (Engle, 1982) to 
estimate the degree to which the current wage index could not be expected by the 
investors looking at the past development. To obtain a measure of the uncertainty of 
labor costs in the entire portfolio, we compute the mean volatility across all locations 
in a year. 
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The variable diversity of labor cost developments shall reflect the heterogeneity of 
contemporary labor cost developments across the locations of the production network. 
We calculate the variance in real manufacturing wage growth of the current set of host 
countries within a year. Since the decision to enlarge the extant network takes time to 
be implemented, all the variables including the controls are lagged by one year. 
 
Control variables 
Market growth is a predominant location factor in market-seeking investment 
decisions (e.g., Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007). The study in hand focuses on 
efficiency-related motives of investment, where local market growth may be less 
important. However, as we cannot distinguish efficiency-seeking from market-seeking 
production subsidiaries in the anonymous dataset, we control for market-related 
motives of investment: Weak market growth in the given locations could be a motive 
for investing in a different location. We operationalize GDP growth by the mean GDP 
growth rate in the existing host countries. Previous research suggests that the 
geographic situation of a country influences a firm’s decision to invest (Brush, 
Maritan, & Karnani, 1999; Nachum, Zaheer, & Gross, 2008). Accordingly, the 
geographic distribution of the existing network may be crucial for the establishment of 
additional production sites. Similar to Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) as well as 
Ojala and Tyrväinen (2007), we calculate the mean capital-to-capital distance of the 
existing locations to the home country Germany as a measure of geographic distance. 
Flores and Aguilera (2007) point to a negative influence of cultural distance on the 
likelihood to invest in a new foreign market. Cultural differences of the existing 
network may also be influential for the probability to establish an additional 
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production subsidiary. We operationalize cultural distance using the cultural indices 
of Hofstede (1980). Following previous work (Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001), we first 
calculate the square root of the sum of squared differences between the four cultural 
dimensions of the respective host countries and Germany, divided by four, and then 
compute the mean across all existing locations. 
Additional sites may be established due to capacity limitations of the existing 
production locations as the firm grows. To separate the effects of growth from cost 
and flexibility considerations, we control for the employment growth rate within the 
existing production network. Since company size may foster (e.g., Tan & Vertinsky, 
1996) or suppress (e.g., Chan, Makino, & Isobe, 2006) international expansion, we 
control for size by the total of employees working for the existing production network. 
MNCs owned by private individuals or families exhibit internationalization strategies 
that are different from other ownership types (George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005; Zahra, 
2003). Ownership may therefore affect the international production configuration. We 
include the dummy variable ownership which has the value one if the firm is held by a 
domestic private individual or family, and zero otherwise. Time dummies account for 
overall effects that may impact on the establishment of additional production 
subsidiaries in the individual years. Table 3.1 summarizes the variables measurement 
and the descriptive statistics. Due to confidentiality policies, minimum and maximum 
values of firm-level variables need to refer to the average of the highest and lowest 
three observations. 
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Table 3.1: Variables measurement and descriptive statistics 
Name Description Mean StdDev Min Max 
uncertainty of labor 
costs 
Average volatility of labor cost developments 
within portfolio (estimated by ARCH models) 73.73 151.40 0.52 1039.99
labor cost 
development 
Average real manufacturing wage growth 
rates across countries in the portfolio 1.77 3.56 -10.20 22.20 
NOC Number of host countries 2.61 1.93 1 14.67 
diversity of labor cost 
developments 
Variance of wage growth rates across 
countries in the portfolio 9.58 34.99 0 537.92 
GDP growth Average GDP growth rates within portfolio 2.67 1.81 -1.93 13.50 
geographic distance Average capital-to-capital distance of the host countries to Germany 942.51 476.37 279.76 3879.89
cultural distance Average cultural distance between host countries and Germany 51.84 12.30 24.72 93.52 
employment growth (Number of employees within portfolio)t - 
(number of employees within portfolio)t-1 
0.18 1.35 -0.89 12.24 
size Number of employees within portfolio 835.26 2006.08 3.33 16558.33
ownership Dummy (=1 if the firm is held by a domestic private individual or family) 
0.34 0.47 0 1 
Number of observations: 352 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Propensity to establish an additional foreign production subsidiary 
The correlation matrix in Table 3.2 reveals that the variables are mostly independent 
of each other. There is some correlation between uncertainty of labor costs and GDP 
growth which indicates that economies that feature strong growth rates are more 
unpredictable. This finding seems plausible regarding the macroeconomic 
developments in Eastern Europe. The positive correlation between NOC (number of 
host countries) and size (number of employees in those locations) is obvious as well. 
The variance inflation factors (VIF) still indicate an acceptable level of 
multicollinearity. 
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Table 3.2: Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 VIF 
1 uncertainty of labor costs 1          1.60 
2 labor cost development 0.05 1         1.20 
3 NOC -0.05 0.14 1        1.48 
4 
diversity of 
labor cost 
developments 
0.23 0.31 0.23 1       1.27 
5 GDP growth 0.52 -0.17 -0.02 0.09 1      1.62 
6 geographic distance -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.19 1     1.15 
7 cultural distance -0.07 -0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.10 -0.18 1    1.13 
8 employment growth 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 1   1.01 
9 size -0.06 0.03 0.52 0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 1  1.42 
10 ownership 0.13 -0.01 -0.14 -0.10 0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.05 -0.17 1 1.09 
Number of observations: 352 
 
To test Hypotheses 3.1, 3.2a, 3.3a, and 3.4a, we employ hazard rate models of the 
propensity to establish an additional production subsidiary abroad. The hazard rate is 
defined as the probability that an event occurs in a given time interval divided by the 
length of that interval. After exploring the dataset with semi-parametric hazard rate 
models (Cox, 1972) we estimated more efficient, parametric Weibull models. They 
are presented in Table 3.3. All regressions feature a significant Weibull parameter 
p > 2 indicating a progressively increasing baseline hazard, which reflects a rising 
probability of establishing an additional foreign production subsidiary in the course of 
time. This finding corresponds to Kogut’s (1983) understanding of FDI as a sequential 
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process of reinvesting earnings in foreign markets. 
 
Table 3.3: Weibull hazard rate regression models of the propensity to establish an 
additional production subsidiary abroad 
new subsidiary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
uncertainty of labor 
costs X diversity of 
labor cost 
developments 
 
    
-1.66E-5***
(3.13E-6) 
-8.38E-6** 
(3.62E-6) 
uncertainty of labor 
costs     
 0.0016*** 
(0.0005) 
 0.0020*** 
(0.0005) 
 0.0019*** 
(0.0005) 
labor cost 
development    
 0.0790*** 
(0.0179)   
 0.0617*** 
(0.0204) 
NOC2  
 
-0.0441*** 
(0.0146)    
-0.0411*** 
(0.0141) 
NOC   0.2814*** (0.0365) 
 0.6944*** 
(0.1326)    
 0.6429*** 
(0.1334) 
diversity of labor 
cost developments 
 0.0038*** 
(0.0011) 
 0.0030** 
(0.0013) 
 0.0027** 
(0.0013) 
 0.0017 
(0.0013) 
 0.0016 
(0.0013) 
 0.0137*** 
(0.0022) 
 0.0049* 
(0.0029) 
GDP growth -0.1283*** (0.0401) 
-0.1082*** 
(0.0413) 
-0.1106*** 
(0.0418) 
-0.1096*** 
(0.0409) 
-0.1988*** 
(0.0465) 
-0.2163*** 
(0.0460) 
-0.1821*** 
(0.0485) 
geographic distance  0.0004** (0.0002) 
 0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
 0.0002 
(0.0002) 
 0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
 0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
 0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
 0.0003** 
(0.0002) 
cultural distance  0.0040 (0.0049) 
 0.0045 
(0.0052) 
 0.0024 
(0.0054) 
 0.0057 
(0.0049) 
 0.0075 
(0.0051) 
 0.0112** 
(0.0053) 
 0.0100* 
(0.0057) 
employment growth  0.0330 (0.0544) 
 0.0449 
(0.0582) 
 0.0523 
(0.0593) 
 0.0265 
(0.0568) 
 0.0263 
(0.0576) 
 0.0280 
(0.0601) 
 0.0376 
(0.0668) 
size  0.0002*** (3.17E-5) 
 0.0001 
(4.09E-5) 
 0.0001** 
(4.33E-5) 
 0.0002*** 
(3.17E-5) 
 0.0002*** 
(3.14E-5) 
 0.0002*** 
(3.03E-5) 
 0.0001*** 
(4.25E-5) 
ownership -0.5361*** (0.1500) 
-0.4295*** 
(0.1498) 
-0.3978*** 
(0.1505) 
-0.5666*** 
(0.1501) 
-0.6527*** 
(0.1559) 
-0.6957*** 
(0.1581) 
-0.5861*** 
(0.1586) 
p  2.3757*** (0.1201) 
 2.5697*** 
(0.1299) 
 2.5818*** 
(0.1296) 
 2.4500*** 
(0.1238) 
 2.4109*** 
(0.1219) 
 2.5054*** 
(0.1259) 
 2.7027*** 
(0.1350) 
Log likelihood -266.98 -243.03*** -236.29*** -258.54*** -262.53*** -249.95*** -222.32*** 
Reference no Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 1 Model 5 Model 1 
Estimation with time dummies; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Model 1 is the base model comprising the control variables. It features a log 
likelihood of -266.98. Ownership exerts a negative influence on the propensity to 
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establish an additional production subsidiary, which may be ascribed to a greater risk 
aversion of family owners. The size and geographic distance of the present foreign 
operations are positively associated with an enlargement of the network. GDP growth 
in the existing locations decreases the urge to establish an additional production 
affiliate due to the importance of market-related motives for production locations that 
have been put forward by previous studies. The variables employment growth and 
cultural distance do not seem to have an influence and stay insignificant in nearly all 
of the following models. As diversity of labor cost developments is instable across the 
models without considering the related uncertainty of labor costs, it does not seem to 
have a clear impact on the decision to enter a new location. 
Model 2 introduces the linear term of NOC. The log likelihood increases significantly 
to -243.03 (likelihood ratio test). Model 3 tests Hypothesis 3.1 by including the 
squared term of NOC, which again increases the log likelihood to -236.29. The linear 
term is positively and the squared term negatively associated with the propensity to 
establish an additional foreign production subsidiary. Since they are significant, they 
support Hypothesis 3.1: As the number of host countries rises, the propensity to 
expand the network of production subsidiaries appears to first increase and then 
decrease. 
The variable labor cost development is incorporated in Model 4 to test 
Hypothesis 3.2a and shows a significant, positive coefficient. The log likelihood 
increases to -258.54. As predicted by Hypothesis 3.2a, rising labor costs within the 
existing network seem to increase the propensity to establish an additional production 
subsidiary. Also, the introduction of uncertainty of labor costs in Model 5 improves 
the log likelihood (-262.53). The significantly positive coefficient supports 
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Hypothesis 3.3a stating that the uncertainty of labor costs in the established network 
of production subsidiaries increases the propensity to set up a new production site. In 
Model 6 uncertainty of labor cost is interacted with diversity of labor cost 
developments in order to test Hypothesis 3.4a. To calculate the interaction term, both 
variables were centered around zero. The log likelihood is significantly higher 
(-249.95) than in Model 5. The negative coefficient supports Hypothesis 3.4a: As the 
diversity of labor costs in the existing network of production subsidiaries creates 
operational flexibility that is valuable under uncertainty, it diminishes the positive 
influence of uncertainty on the propensity to establish an additional production 
subsidiary. The hypothesized influences remain stable in the complete Model 7. 
 
3.4.2 Cost and flexibility improvement of the production network 
The previous analysis centered on the cost and flexibility characteristics of the 
existing production network whilst ignoring the quality of the potential new locations. 
We now address the question of whether the 245 firms that decided to invest selected 
a location that increased the net present value and the flexibility value of the 
production network. Table 3.4 provides a country breakdown of the chosen locations. 
To ensure confidentiality, all numbers referring to less than four investment objects 
are concealed. 
In order to test Hypotheses 3.2b, 3.3b, and 3.4b, we introduce the variables change in 
labor cost development, change in uncertainty of labor costs and change in diversity 
of labor cost developments. They indicate the relative change effectuated by the  
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expansion. We employ Student t tests to check whether the changes are significant. 
Table 3.5 presents the results. 
 
Table 3.4: Number of additional production subsidiaries in the sample per host 
country 
Country Number of additional 
subsidiaries 
Austria 11 
Azerbaijan < 4 
Belgium 10 
Bulgaria < 4 
Czech Republic 26 
Denmark < 4 
Finland < 4 
France 28 
Hungary 10 
Ireland < 4 
Italy 21 
Luxembourg < 4 
Netherlands 8 
Norway 5 
Portugal < 4 
Russian Federation 17 
Slovak Republic 14 
Spain 24 
Sweden 6 
Switzerland 14 
Turkey 9 
Ukraine 4 
United Kingdom 23 
Total 245 
 
Table 3.5: T test of changes in the cost and flexibility characteristics of the 
international production network 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Pr(T > t) Pr(T < t) 
change in diversity of labor 
cost developments 245  3.8492  36.1632 0.0485 0.9515 
change in uncertainty of labor 
costs 245  8.9850  45.3774 0.0011 0.9989 
change in labor cost 
development 245 -0.3046  0.4303 1.0000 0.0000 
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The change in labor cost development is significant and negative. As we predicted in 
Hypothesis 3.2b, investors seem to establish an additional foreign production 
subsidiary in a location that decreases the labor cost growth within the country 
portfolio. By contrast, the change in uncertainty of labor costs indicates a positive 
change; i. e. investors do not appear to avoid entries to locations with volatile wages. 
We have to reject Hypothesis 3.3b. Hypothesis 3.4b states that investors will choose a 
location that contributes to a greater diversity of labor cost developments within the 
production network. Its prediction is supported by the significant positive change in 
diversity of labor cost developments. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Our analysis of international production networks of German firms suggests that the 
operational flexibility provided by an existing set of locations is an important decision 
determinant for the establishment of an additional production site. The potential of a 
production network to provide operational flexibility appears to rise by its size, even 
though additional locations make decreasing marginal contributions to operational 
flexibility. Furthermore, for an international production network to provide 
operational flexibility, the factor costs in the locations must not change in parallel. 
The results show that MNCs tend to stay with production locations with uncertain 
labor costs if the diversity of volatile labor cost movements in those countries is high. 
Rising and uncertain labor costs generally urge MNCs to enter complementary 
production locations that compensate for the cost deficiencies of the established 
facilities. 
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Earlier studies that investigated the establishment of additional foreign subsidiaries 
(including sales and other units) found a linear positive effect of the number of 
previous entries on the probability of subsequent investments (Chang, 1995; Delios & 
Henisz, 2003). Understanding the value of an international production network as the 
ability to shift capacities across countries, the benefit of adding foreign locations is 
limited. The findings of this analysis support the rationale that increasing coordination 
costs confine the MNC’s propensity to further expand if the scope of the production 
network offers a sufficient amount of operational flexibility. Going beyond prior work 
on sequential foreign direct investment, our study contemplates the cost and flexibility 
characteristics of the foreign subsidiaries that have been established earlier. Rising 
and uncertain labor costs reduce the net present value of the production network and 
suggest enlarging it whereas the diversity of uncertain labor cost developments within 
the portfolio increases the flexibility value and diminishes the positive influence of 
uncertainty on the propensity to expand. 
Research on foreign direct investment decisions has examined the characteristics of 
the host country to be chosen (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Desbordes, 
2007; Flores & Aguilera, 2007) and the investor’s home country (Witt & Lewin, 
2007) whilst paying little attention to the characteristics of the countries that have 
been chosen as locations before. Our investigation adds to this knowledge by stressing 
the importance of the existing multinational production network for efficiency-seeking 
investment decisions. Ex-ante, the analysis leaves characteristics of the target and 
location aside. Instead we regard the cost and flexibility characteristics of the existing 
network of production subsidiaries as influencing factors for the decision to establish 
an additional production site abroad. Once the decision on establishing a new 
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production subsidiary has been made, we show ex-post that its location helps improve 
the cost and flexibility characteristics of the extant production network. This finding 
suggests that the quality of a host country as a production location depends on the 
firm’s present configuration of international production and is highly company-
specific. 
The fact that the location quality of host countries can be company-specific leads to a 
strong implication for management. The more diversified the international production 
system of an MNC, the less applicable are uniform tools (e. g. the BERI index) to 
assess foreign locations. In literature, factors that refer to individual locations 
dominate over flexibility considerations of the whole network as motives for locating 
production subsidiaries abroad. Managers should pay more attention to the operational 
flexibility contribution of additional facilities when expanding foreign production 
networks and choosing appropriate locations. Thus, a new production site should be 
evaluated by its strategic fit within the existing portfolio. Secondly, the results show 
that investors reduce their labor cost growth by establishing new production 
subsidiaries, whereas they seem to accept increasing uncertainty of labor costs. 
Managers should not only assess the current labor cost levels when choosing a foreign 
country as a production location but also their likely developments in the future. 
Host country governments that seek to attract foreign direct investments need to be 
aware that each investor evaluates the country’s appropriateness as a production 
location in an individual context. Positioning the own country against competing 
locations successfully requires having the country excel others concerning both 
general criteria and the distinct fit with the investor’s existing locations. The more 
developed the international production network of the investor, the more difficult and 
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costly it can be to offer attractive conditions to the investor. The likely consequences 
are that governmental location marketing should be individualized for large investors 
and focused on those investors who can expect a contribution to operational flexibility 
from the new location. 
The analysis has a number of limitations, some of which are due to missing 
information in the anonymous dataset. If we had more detailed information on the 
subsidiary level, we would be better able to differentiate between market-seeking and 
efficiency-seeking motives of foreign direct investment; the positive influence of 
GDP growth indicates that some of the production facilities also serve the local 
market. Furthermore, it would be possible to track outsourcing production capacity 
from contractors. Data restrictions made it difficult to investigate the influence of 
strategic motivations (e. g. access to specific resources or the need to follow important 
customers) for the propensity to establish an additional production subsidiary abroad. 
Neither were we able to distinguish greenfield investments from acquisitions (the 
latter of which can be instantly employed). Nevertheless, future research can build on 
the findings of the analysis to advance the theory of international production. 
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4. CONTRACTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
 PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
4.1 Research context 
After analysing expansion decisions as strategies for improving the cost and flexibility 
conditions of an international production network, we will now investigate the role of 
operational flexibility in decisions to contract as a second means of network 
reconfiguration. As international divestment strategies involve massive capacity 
decisions for multinational corporations, they attract rising attention in international 
business research (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009). Viewing foreign affiliates as 
gateways to foreign demand and supply markets, research on international divestment 
has mainly identified factors of survival that relate to the individual subsidiary. The 
decision to divest, however, may also depend on the role played by the subsidiary in 
relation to other subsidiaries or to the MNC as a whole (Benito, 2005). If a candidate 
for closure is established as part of an integrated production network, the decision is 
subject to the characteristics of the remaining network as well (Belderbos & Zou, 
2009). This chapter sheds light on the determinants of divestment decisions that refer 
to the configuration of international networks of production subsidiaries in different 
locations. 
Many international ventures are divested for financial reasons (Jagersma & van Gorp, 
2003). Accordingly, studies regard the closure of a foreign affiliate as a consequence 
of performing below expectations. Host country characteristics exert an influence on 
performance, and hence, the survival chance of the subsidiary. While economic and 
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industry growth decrease the propensity to divest (Benito, 1997; Mudambi & Zahra, 
2007), competitor entry rates into the industry (Mata & Portugal, 2000; Mata & 
Portugal, 2002) and cultural distance from the home country (Barkema, Bell, & 
Pennings, 1996; Li & Guisinger, 1991) seem to increase it. On the subsidiary level, 
joint ventures are more often divested than wholly-owned subsidiaries (Delios & 
Makino, 2003; Ogasavara & Hoshino, 2008). Similarly, acquisitions show lower 
survival rates vis-à-vis greenfield investments (Li & Guisinger, 1991; Shaver, 1995). 
Furthermore, subsidiaries that add to a firm’s product diversification have a lower 
chance of survival (Hennart, Kim, & Zeng, 1998; Li, 1995). Regarding parent firm 
characteristics, empirical studies revealed lower divestment rates for firms that 
possess host country experience (Li, 1995; Shaver, Mitchell, & Yeung, 1997) and 
technological advantage (Belderbos, 2003; Delios & Beamish, 2001). Confirming the 
rationale that parent companies divest affiliates which decrease the overall success of 
the firm, Haynes, Thompson, and Wright (2002) find (on a national level) that 
divestments improve a company’s performance. Besides financial reasons, strategic 
motivations may drive international divestment decisions (Benito & Welch, 1997; 
Boddewyn, 1979). Makino et al. (2007) show that international joint ventures are 
terminated if their purposes have been achieved. In this case, the divestment is a 
strategic move of the corporate group rather than an outcome of the subsidiary’s 
financial failure. Altogether, previous research has produced rich insights into the 
determinants of foreign subsidiary survival. Interrelations with other foreign 
production subsidiaries of the firm as influencing factors of the divestment decision 
have, however, been mostly disregarded. 
The concept of operational flexibility states that a primary advantage of multinational 
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corporations is the flexibility to transfer resources, e. g. production capacity, between 
locations in different countries as a reaction to environmental changes (Kogut, 1985). 
Chung, Lu and Beamish (2008) highlight network characteristics that influence the 
survival of foreign subsidiaries. The study employs a composite figure that measures 
the network development incorporating the number of foreign subsidiaries and the 
number of host countries to express the importance of an individual subsidiary to the 
whole network. Several studies on international subsidiary closures account for 
properties of the international network in an implicit way as they include the number 
of foreign subsidiaries (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Benito, 1997) or the 
number of host countries (Yamawaki, 1997) as a measure of the investor’s 
international experience. The results, however, are not congruent. One explanation 
may be that not only the size but also the configuration of an international production 
network determines a subsidiary’s importance to the network. Belderbos and Zou 
(2009) use the concept of operational flexibility to identify factors of foreign 
manufacturing affiliate divestments. In contrast to Chung, Lu and Beamish (2008), 
they consider the characteristics of an international production network’s set of host 
countries rather than the network size alone. The findings suggest that growing labor 
costs in a location and a correlation with the macroeconomic conditions in other 
locations increase the propensity to divest a foreign subsidiary. A differentiation 
between subsidiaries that are the sole investment in the target market and subsidiaries 
that are not the sole investment shows that, according to the logic of operational 
flexibility, location characteristics of the production network are only relevant to the 
decision of closure when the subsidiary exit involves a complete withdrawal from the 
location. 
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Our analysis seeks to extend this new stream of research based on the concept of 
operational flexibility by stressing the flexibility value of a location that is part of an 
international production network. Rising labor costs make a location less profitable 
and suggest shifting production elsewhere in the network. However, divesting this 
location would kill the opportunity to shift back production if cost conditions go into 
reverse. As long as the local labor market is flexible enough to allow for temporary 
capacity adjustments, investors are likely to hold the location even if labor costs are 
presently rising. Similarly, uncertain labor costs in a location complicate production 
planning and will generally induce investors to shift production to more stable 
locations. Nevertheless this location can be valuable for production shifting if its labor 
cost development is different from the remaining network. The aim of this analysis is 
to show that divestments of individual production locations depend on labor cost 
developments throughout the international production network and are less likely if 
they enhance the opportunity to shift production. 
The next section of the chapter develops a model that predicts international 
divestment decisions drawing on cost and flexibility characteristics of an international 
production network. In the third section, the empirical research design will be 
described before the results of the empirical analysis are presented in section four. The 
fifth section concludes the chapter with a discussion of the findings. 
 
4.2 Theoretical development 
We build a model of the decision to withdraw from a country as a production location 
that is part of an international network. The value V of this location consists of two 
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elements: its net present value NPV and its flexibility value F. 
V=NPV+F 
Both values are influenced by the actual cost development µ and its uncertainty σ in 
the production network. Growth and unpredictability of costs make a production 
location less efficient and, therefore, directly affect the NPV. The flexibility value F 
reflects an MNC’s potential to adjust its production process according to µ and σ. 
Given an MNC’s need N to react to changing conditions, F is determined by the 
opportunity O to do it by capacity adjustments in the focal production location. 
V=NPV(µ,σ) + N(µ,σ) * O 
Labor cost advantages of foreign countries are a major motivation to establish 
production sites outside the home market (e.g., Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Studies 
also show that higher wage rates prevent investors from entering a foreign market 
(Bellak & Leibrecht, 2009; Carstensen & Toubal, 2004). International investors do not, 
however, expect favorable cost conditions to be permanent. Labor costs may rise 
dramatically when a large number of MNCs locate production facilities in a certain 
country because labor is relatively cheap. Since rising labor costs have a negative 
impact on foreign subsidiary performance (Chan, Isobe, & Makino, 2008), firms try to 
reduce the cost of production. They enhance productivity through technology and 
training, thus cost-efficient production is also possible in high-wage countries 
(Mucchielli & Saucier, 1997). However, if cost savings do not suffice to recover 
production efficiency, the MNC is prone to consider different locations as substitutes 
for former low cost countries that have become too expensive and relocate its 
production to countries that offer more favorable cost conditions. Rising labor costs 
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will generally lower the net present value NPV of a production location and make it 
less attractive to the investor. 
Hypothesis 4.1a: Rising labor costs increase the propensity to leave a 
country as a production location. 
Since the divestment decision is made in a network perspective, the question of 
whether or not to leave a host country is also contingent on labor cost developments in 
alternative locations. Belderbos and Zou (2007) confirm that MNCs adjust their 
workforce in one host country as a consequence of cost developments in the other 
locations of the production network. Rising labor costs in other locations make the 
focal production location relatively more valuable and influence the judgment of its 
NPV. We therefore assume that an MNC is less willing to eliminate a location from 
the network when labor cost developments in the other locations are unfavorable. 
Hypothesis 4.1b: Rising labor costs in the residual network reduce the 
propensity to leave a country as a production location. 
Rising labor costs influence the cost structure of an MNC and generate a need to react 
to those changes flexibly, that is, to shift production from a location that becomes 
relatively more expensive to a location that becomes relatively less expensive. When 
labor cost developments are different across countries, a location that becomes more 
expensive today may become attractive as a production location again in the future. 
Therefore, MNCs do not immediately react to rising labor costs by a complete 
withdrawal from the foreign location but rather with a reduction of the workforce 
(Belderbos & Zou, 2007). The opportunity to operate flexibly through dismissal of 
workers is contingent on the regulation of the local labor market. Countries exhibit 
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Ease of dismissal
different intensities of labor market regulation and thus impose different costs on 
firms who dismiss workers, for example, in the form of complex legal requirements, 
severance payments, or long notice periods (World Bank, 2009). Previous findings 
suggest that investors do not seem to anticipate the costs that are associated with rigid 
labor markets (Leibrecht & Scharler, 2009). An MNC that has built an international 
network of production locations will only consider leaving a foreign country with 
rising labor costs if labor market regulations impede the opportunity to exercise 
operational flexibility and thus diminish the flexibility value F of the location. We put 
this argument in a positive way and expect that 
Hypothesis 4.1c: Ease of employee dismissal reduces the effect of labor 
cost growth on the propensity to leave a country as a production location. 
The first set of propositions is summarized by Figure 4.1. It illustrates the 
hypothesized influences of Hypotheses 4.1a, 4.1b, and 4.1c. 
 
Figure 4.1: Illustration of hypotheses on the propensity to withdraw from a host 
country I 
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The future developments of labor costs in a host country can be hard to predict. 
Wages may have volatile growth rates, especially in emerging economies that are 
often preferred as investment locations by firms who target low cost labor, for 
example, in Eastern Europe (International Labour Organization, 2009). The lack of 
predictability makes the choice of efficient manufacturing technologies and the design 
of cost-minimizing production processes difficult (de Meza & van der Ploeg, 1987). 
Labor-cost volatility leads to an extra discount on the cash flows that are going to be 
generated by the production sites in a country and decreases the net present value NPV 
of the foreign production location. 
Hypothesis 4.2a: Uncertainty of labor costs increases the propensity to 
leave a country as a production location. 
Investors do not however build their divestment decisions only on the uncertainty of 
labor costs in a single country. They will also consider the cost predictability of other 
locations in the production network. Uncertain labor cost developments in the 
alternative locations will lead to a more positive judgment of the NPV of the focal 
production location and make it a less likely candidate for divestment. 
Hypothesis 4.2b: Uncertainty of labor costs in the residual network 
reduces the propensity to leave a country as a production location. 
Volatile labor costs require an ongoing adjustment of international production flows 
by shifting capacities across countries. However, Chung et al. (2010) demonstrate that 
MNCs do not shift production internationally if macro-economic conditions among 
foreign locations are redundant, that is, when environments change in parallel. 
Belderbos and Zou (2009) show that multinational portfolio redundancy as the 
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correlation of exchange rates between an affiliate’s host country and the other 
countries of the production network lead to a higher propensity to divest. Conversely, 
a location in which wage rates fluctuate in different directions than in the remaining 
locations provides an opportunity to shift production when there is a need for 
production shifting due to volatile labor costs. The contribution to the diversity of 
labor cost movements within the production network increases the flexibility value F 
of the focal location. Consequently, the propensity to divestment will be lower. 
Hypothesis 4.2c: The contribution of a location to the diversity of labor 
cost developments in the network reduces the effect of uncertainty of labor 
costs on the propensity to leave a country as a production location. 
The second set of propositions is summarized by Figure 4.2. It illustrates Hypotheses 
4.2a, 4.2b, and 4.2c.  
 
Figure 4.2: Illustration of hypotheses on the propensity to withdraw from a host 
country II 
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4.3 Empirical methods 
4.3.1 Data 
We test our hypotheses on firm-level data of German manufacturing MNCs. The 
Central Bank of Germany maintains a database that comprises anonymous 
information about all foreign direct investment objects of German parent firms above 
a balance sheet total of € 3 million. The reports include balance sheets, the stock of 
foreign direct investment, and other characteristics of the foreign subsidiaries. They 
are available as panel data on an annual basis and are assigned to investors by 
consistent identification numbers from 1996 on. For this analysis, we closed the data 
set with definite figures from 2006 and preliminary figures from 2007. Besides firm-
level data, we included country-level data of the World Bank, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), and the World Economic Forum. 
The Central Bank FDI database allows us to filter out the production affiliates of the 
German parent firms. Because of transportation and coordination costs, a low physical 
distance facilitates earning benefits from operational flexibility (Rugman & Verbeke, 
2004). Like Belderbos and Zou’s (2007) study that includes nine production locations 
of Japanese MNCs in the East Asian region, we limit the analysis of production 
subsidiaries to one geographical region. Our investigation centers on European 
production locations, since Europe is the most relevant production region of German 
MNCs, accounting for 56 % of their foreign production. The second reason that makes 
Europe an appropriate empirical environment is that MNCs evaluate factor costs in 
the currency of their home country, whilst exchange rate fluctuations superimpose 
international factor cost movements. In European production networks, exchange rate 
fluctuations play a minor role due to the euro (European Central Bank, 2007). The 
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levels and movements of labor costs among European countries, however, are very 
diverse (International Labour Organization, 2009), as are the levels of labor market 
regulation (World Bank, 2009). 
In order to investigate complete withdrawals from foreign locations, we aggregated all 
the production subsidiaries an investor maintains in a country. Subsidiaries reporting 
negative equity and investors reporting no turnover of the corporate group were 
excluded from the analysis. We analyse withdrawals (if they occur) from production 
locations between 2002 and 2007 that had been entered after 1996. To exclude 
investment decisions that were rapidly retracted, the production location had to remain 
s in the investor’s country portfolio for at least two consecutive years. To avoid a bias 
from firms that left the databank during the observation period, we included only 
parent firms that were under observation for the full period until 2007. We consider a 
set of production locations as an international network if it embraces subsidiaries in 
more than two European countries before the withdrawal from one location. We 
finally obtain a panel of 596 production locations of 189 German MNCs. Table 4.1 
displays the countries and their frequency as production locations. To ensure 
confidentiality, all numbers referring to less than four observations are concealed. 
 
4.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variable 
In accordance with the majority of studies on international divestment decisions on 
the subsidiary level (e.g., Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009; Pan & Chi, 1999) we use a 
binary coding for the dependent variable country exit. It takes the value one in the 
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year in which an investor withdraws from a country as a production location, and zero 
otherwise. Within the period between 2002 and 2007, 143 country exits occurred 
among the 596 locations. 
 
Table 4.1: Countries and their frequency included in the analysis 
Country Frequency 
Austria 40 
Belgium 24 
Bulgaria < 4 
Czech Republic 33 
Croatia 4 
Denmark 11 
Estonia < 4 
Finland 8 
France 80 
Greece 10 
Hungary 24 
Ireland 8 
Italy 55 
Latvia < 4 
Lithuania < 4 
Moldova < 4 
Netherlands 25 
Norway 6 
Poland 42 
Portugal 20 
Romania 8 
Russian Federation 5 
Slovak Republic 14 
Spain 76 
Sweden 12 
Switzerland 23 
Turkey 19 
Ukraine < 4 
United Kingdom 38 
Total 596 
 
Independent variables 
Labor cost developments in foreign locations were taken from the ILO’s Key 
Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) databank, 6th edition (2009). To calculate 
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labor cost development, we use the real manufacturing wage index as a basis, which is 
the nominal wages index corrected for changes in purchasing power measured by the 
consumer price index (100 * nominal wage index/consumer price index). We subtract 
the wage index of the previous year from the wage index of the present year to obtain 
the annual growth rate. To measure the residual network’s labor cost development we 
calculate the mean growth rates across all other production locations of the MNC. 
We also draw on the ILO real manufacturing wage index to measure uncertainty of 
labor costs. Like earlier studies that incorporate uncertainty by the volatility of a 
macroeconomic indicator (Campa, 2004; Folta & O'Brien, 2004), we use an 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) process (Engle, 1982) to estimate 
the degree to which the current wage index could not be predicted by the investors 
looking at past development. We compute the residual network’s uncertainty of labor 
costs by the mean of labor cost uncertainties across all production locations of the 
MNC except the focal location. 
The variable contribution to network diversity shall reflect the heterogeneity of labor 
cost developments added by the focal location to the whole production network. From 
the variance in real manufacturing wage growth rates across the full set of host 
countries in a year, we subtract the variance in the network without the focal location. 
A positive value indicates that the heterogeneity of labor cost developments is higher 
including the focal country, and a negative value means that the heterogeneity of the 
network is higher without that country. 
The World Bank publishes the annual survey “Doing Business” that reports on 
business regulation and the protection of property rights as well as their effects on 
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businesses in 183 economies (World Bank, 2009). The data are useful for foreign 
investors to evaluate countries as investment targets and are often employed as 
indicators in empirical studies (e.g., Atanassov & Kim, 2009; Botero et al., 2004). In 
particular, the reports include information on national labor market regulations, which 
are provided by local lawyers and public officials. We invert the “difficulty of firing” 
index in order to measure ease of dismissal. The index contains eight components that 
describe how easily workers can be laid off, for example, whether redundancy is 
allowed as a basis for terminating workers or whether the employer needs to notify a 
third party to terminate a redundant worker. 
 
Control variables 
Previous research proposed a variety of factors on the host country, subsidiary, and 
parent firm level that influence international divestments. We check for these factors 
as far as data were available. Referring to host country characteristics, market growth 
proved to be an important location factor of international investment decisions (e.g., 
Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007) and divestment of foreign production 
subsidiaries (Benito, 1997). If production subsidiaries, among other markets, serve 
local demand, GDP growth (source: World Bank) should lower the propensity to 
withdraw from that country. Higher costs of imports make local production more 
attractive and will decrease the propensity to divest. In Europe, tariffs or import 
restrictions can be largely neglected. There are, however, costs for documents, 
administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, terminal handling 
charges, and domestic transport. We measure those costs as obstacles to imports, 
which we also obtained from the “Doing Business” surveys of the World Bank. The 
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figures refer to the costs per 20-foot container in U.S. dollars. The overall political 
climate of the host country has a strong influence on the survival of foreign 
investment objects (Akhter & Choudhry, 1993; Hadjikhani & Johanson, 1996). In its 
annual executive opinion surveys (Schwab, 2009), the World Economic Forum raises 
the question whether the threat of terrorism imposes significant costs on business, 
which introduces a measure of the variable political stability. It ranges from one (high 
costs) to seven (low costs, i. e. highly stable). Cultural distance between the home and 
the host country may impede foreign business activities and has revealed a negative 
impact on subsidiary survival (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Li & Guisinger, 
1991). We operationalize cultural distance using the extended list of cultural indices 
by Hofstede (1980). Following previous work (Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001), we 
calculate the square root of the sum of the squared differences between those four 
cultural dimensions of the respective host countries and Germany, divided by four. As 
higher cultural distance is likely to cause costs of coordination when exercising 
production flexibility, we expect a positive influence on the probability to withdraw 
from a foreign production location. 
On the subsidiary level, performance indicators seem to be driving forces on the 
decision to divest an affiliate or not (Benito & Welch, 1997; Jagersma & van Gorp, 
2003). In order to separate financial reasons for withdrawal from the strategic 
motivations of operational flexibility, we measure profitability of a foreign location by 
the average return on sales generated by the production subsidiaries within a country. 
We expect that the more profitable a foreign location, the lower is the propensity to 
leave this location. Since previous studies found that joint ventures show a higher 
probability of termination (Delios & Makino, 2003; Ogasavara & Hoshino, 2008), we 
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control for the average equity share of the investor’s affiliates in a host country. 
Another factor that may influence divestment is the importance of the production 
location, which we measure by the (logarithmized) sales volume of the subsidiaries in 
a location. As sales reflect the potential of in-country advantages of scale and scope 
we expect that the divestment propensity will be lower when sales are high in a 
foreign location. 
Regarding influence factors on the corporate level, previous research employs the 
number of host countries to account for network or learning effects as determinants of 
subsidiary survival (Yamawaki, 1997). We include the number of countries in which 
an investor maintains production subsidiaries by the variable NOC since the 
opportunity to operate flexibly tends to rise with the number of locations (Allen & 
Pantzalis, 1996; Lee & Makhija, 2009; Tang & Tikoo, 1999). The decision to 
withdraw from a country may be part of an overall restructuring process of the MNC. 
We therefore include the variable number of previous country exits, which captures 
the number of previous withdrawals from other foreign locations. Finally, we control 
for ownership of the corporate group. MNCs owned by private individuals or families 
exhibit internationalization strategies that are different from other ownership types 
(George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005; Zahra, 2003). Ownership may therefore affect 
international divestment decisions. We include the dummy variable ownership which 
has the value one if the firm is held by a domestic private individual or family, and 
zero otherwise. Table 4.2 summarizes the variables measurement and displays the 
descriptive statistics. Due to confidentiality policies, minimum and maximum values 
of firm-level variables need to refer to the average of the highest and lowest three 
observations. 
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Table 4.2: Variables measurement and descriptive statistics 
Name Description Mean StdDev Min Max 
residual network’s 
uncertainty of labor 
costs 
Residual network’s average volatility of labor 
cost developments (estimated by ARCH 
models) 
70.34 76.08 0.67 561.8 
uncertainty of labor 
costs 
Volatility of labor cost developments 
(estimated by ARCH models) 53.79 128.01 0.54 1111 
residual network’s 
labor cost 
development 
Residual network’s average real 
manufacturing wage growth 4.82 11.05 -38.1 57.8 
labor cost 
development Real manufacturing wage growth 3.14 19.24 -59.3 97.7 
contribution to 
network diversity 
Variance of wage growth rates across 
countries in the portfolio with vs. without focal 
location 
-23.64 275.66 -2681 2514 
ease of dismissal Inverted “Difficulty of firing” index 37.67 14.71 0 60 
GDP growth GDP growth rate 3.54 2.13 -0.81 10.42 
obstacles to imports Costs of importing 1032.2 257.07 420 2050 
political stability Inverted “Business costs of terrorism” 5.07 0.65 3.80 6.50 
cultural distance Cultural distance to Germany 2777 1571 611 8746 
profitability Average return on sales within a host country 0.04 0.12 -0.63 0.73 
equity share Average equity share within a host country 0.93 0.17 0.15 1 
sales volume Log of sales within a host country 11.04 1.53 7.60 15.78 
NOC Number of host countries 7.18 5.59 3 29 
number of previous 
country exits 
Number of previous withdrawals from other 
foreign locations 
3.28 3.00 1 20 
ownership Dummy (=1 if the firm is held by a domestic private individual or family) 
0.28 0.45 0 1 
Number of observations: 596 
 
4.4 Results 
The correlation matrix in Table 4.3 reveals that the variables are mostly independent 
of each other. There is a strong correlation between uncertainty of labor costs and 
labor cost development as well as residual network’s uncertainty of labor costs and 
residual network’s labor cost development, which indicates that locations that feature 
high wage growth rates are also more unpredictable in their wage developments.  
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Table 4.3: Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
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The positive correlation between number of previous country exits and NOC is 
evident; however, we decided to integrate both variables as controls since their impact 
on divestment decisions may be different. With a mean of 1.85, the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) indicate an acceptable level of multicollinearity. 
Hazard rate models are an appropriate means for analysing the survival of investment 
objects (e.g., Chen & Wu, 1996; Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 
1997). The hazard rate is defined as the probability that a certain event, for example, 
the termination of an international venture, will occur within a given time interval 
divided by the length of that interval. We employ a hazard model that is implemented 
in non-parametric regressions (Cox, 1972). It delivers an efficient estimation of the 
hypothesized influences on the decision to exit a foreign production location even 
though we have no assumption about the baseline hazard. The regression results are 
presented in Tables 4.4a and 4.4b. 
Model 1 is the base model. It includes the control and moderating variables with a log 
likelihood of -825.26. Looking at the country-level variables, the results correspond to 
existing studies. GDP growth exerts a stable negative influence on the propensity to 
withdraw from a foreign location. The impact of obstacles to imports and political 
stability is also negative and mostly stable. Cultural distance has a positive influence 
on the propensity to divest a foreign production location in the full model only. On the 
subsidiary level, profitability proves to prevent exit from a foreign country. In 
agreement with previous findings on the divestment of joint ventures, a higher equity 
share of the affiliates in the host country is associated with a lower propensity to 
divestment. 
 
62
Table 4.4a: Cox hazard rate regressions of the propensity to withdraw from a host 
country I 
country exit Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
uncertainty of labor 
costs X contribution to 
network diversity  
    
residual network’s 
uncertainty of labor 
costs 
    
uncertainty of labor 
costs     
labor cost 
development X ease 
of dismissal 
   -0.0016*** (0.0005) 
residual network’s 
labor cost 
development 
  -0.0308*** (0.0086)  
labor cost 
development  
-0.0009 
(0.0058)  
 0.0022 
(0.0057) 
contribution to network 
diversity 
 0.0007 
(0.0005) 
 0.0007 
(0.0005) 
 0.0004 
(0.0005) 
 0.0010** 
(0.0005) 
ease of dismissal -0.0166*** (0.0063) 
-0.0164** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0155** 
(0.0063) 
-0.0160** 
(0.0064) 
GDP growth -0.4739*** (0.0700) 
-0.4742*** 
(0.0703) 
-0.4428*** 
(0.0694) 
-0.5696*** 
(0.0775) 
obstacles to imports -0.0016*** (0.0004) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0021*** 
(0.0004) 
political stability -0.3764** (0.1678) 
-0.3729** 
(0.1694) 
-0.2933* 
(0.1683) 
-0.2137 
(0.1761) 
cultural distance  2.63E-5 (8.17E-5) 
 2.68E-5 
(8.32E-5) 
 1.96E-5 
(8.24E-5) 
 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
profitability -1.5406*** (0.5626) 
-1.5413*** 
(0.5629) 
-1.5925*** 
(0.5789) 
-1.612*** 
(0.5655) 
equity share -0.8843* (0.4646) 
-0.8868* 
(0.4647) 
-0.9011* 
(0.4624) 
-0.7508 
(0.4646) 
sales volume -0.1620** (0.0628) 
-0.1616** 
(0.0629) 
-0.1425** 
(0.0632) 
-0.1427** 
(0.0632) 
NOC -0.0496* (0.0271) 
-0.0502* 
(0.0274) 
-0.0419 
(0.0275) 
-0.0562** 
(0.0275) 
number of previous 
country exits 
 0.0953* 
(0.0515) 
 0.0965* 
(0.0523) 
 0.0818 
(0.0521) 
 0.1144** 
(0.0540) 
ownership -0.3777* (0.2058) 
-0.3789* 
(0.2060) 
-0.4366** 
(0.2069) 
-0.3861* 
(0.2080) 
Log likelihood -825.26 -825.24 -818.68*** -820.85*** 
Reference no (base model) Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 
Objects 596 596 596 596 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
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The flexibility perspective provides an additional argument that joint ventures are 
more likely to be shut down: Operating a production facility with a partner makes 
decisions on capacity adjustment more complex since a local partner might be 
reluctant to degrade the joint venture. The negative influence of sales volume suggests 
that the more important a host country for an investor, the less likely is its elimination 
from the portfolio. On the corporate level, the size of the production network seems to 
impede divestment, while preceding divestment decisions concerning other locations 
tend to have a negative influence on further divestment. NOC and number of previous 
country exits are, however, rather unstable throughout the models. Finally, ownership 
exerts a negative influence on divestment, which may be attributed to more cautious 
internationalization paths of private owners. The moderator variable contribution to 
network diversity is mostly insignificant whereas ease of dismissal seems to deter 
withdrawal from a foreign country. 
In Model 2, the variable labor cost development is introduced in order to test 
Hypothesis 4.1a. The coefficient is not significant. Therefore, we reject our first 
Hypothesis. Model 3 incorporates the variable residual network’s labor cost 
development to test Hypothesis 4.1b. It raises the log likelihood to -818.68 and has a 
significant negative coefficient, which supports the prediction that rising labor costs in 
the remaining countries of the production network lower the divestment propensity in 
the focal location. In Model 4, labor cost development is interacted with ease of 
dismissal. For interactions, variables were centered around zero. The log likelihood of 
Model 4 is significantly higher than in Model 2 (-820.85). The coefficient is negative, 
which supports Hypothesis 4.1c. The opportunity to react to deteriorating cost 
conditions by capacity reduction seems to prevent withdrawal from locations with 
rising labor costs. 
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Table 4.4b: Cox hazard rate regressions of the propensity to withdraw from a host 
country II 
country exit Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
uncertainty of labor 
costs X contribution to 
network diversity  
  -1.59E-5* (8.65E-6) 
-2.56E-5** 
(1.07E-5) 
residual network’s 
uncertainty of labor 
costs  
 -0.0048*** (0.0018)  
-0.0012 
(0.0023) 
uncertainty of labor 
costs  
 0.0013 
(0.0013)  
 0.0039** 
(0.0018) 
 0.0065*** 
(0.0019) 
labor cost 
development X ease 
of dismissal 
   -0.0022*** (0.0006) 
residual network’s 
labor cost 
development 
   -0.0290** (0.0117) 
labor cost 
development    
 0.0003 
(0.0076) 
contribution to network 
diversity 
 0.0006 
(0.0004) 
 0.0002 
(0.0005) 
 0.0006 
(0.0005) 
 0.0004 
(0.0006) 
ease of dismissal -0.0180*** (0.0065) 
-0.0158** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0203*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0197*** 
(0.0067) 
GDP growth -0.4918*** (0.0722) 
-0.4609*** 
(0.0698) 
-0.5051*** 
(0.0712) 
-0.6032*** 
(0.0784) 
obstacles to imports -0.0017*** (0.0004) 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0025*** 
(0.0004) 
political stability -0.4270** (0.1764) 
-0.3281* 
(0.1685) 
-0.5127*** 
(0.1844) 
-0.2243 
(0.1874) 
cultural distance  3.86E-5 (8.23E-5) 
 4.61E-5 
(8.19E-5) 
 4.26E-5 
(8.12E-5) 
 0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
profitability -1.5042*** (0.5625) 
-1.3946** 
(0.5662) 
-1.5353*** 
(0.5675) 
-1.6571*** 
(0.5957) 
equity share -0.8627* (0.4659) 
-0.9509** 
(0.4619) 
-0.8263* 
(0.4672) 
-0.6060 
(0.4709) 
sales volume -0.1611** (0.0628) 
-0.1663*** 
(0.06235) 
-0.1647*** 
(0.0633) 
-0.1226* 
(0.0646) 
NOC -0.0478* (0.0271) 
-0.0341 
(0.0277) 
-0.0468* 
(0.0273) 
-0.0477* 
(0.0287) 
number of previous 
country exits 
 0.0832 
(0.0528) 
 0.0846 
(0.0528) 
 0.0844 
(0.0523) 
 0.0829 
(0.0556) 
ownership -0.3758* (0.2057) 
-0.4304** 
(0.2057) 
-0.3746* 
(0.2075) 
-0.4340** 
(0.2110) 
Log likelihood -824.87 -820.58*** -822.36** -807.49*** 
Reference Model 1 Model 1 Model 5 Model 1 
Objects 596 596 596 596 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
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The variable uncertainty of labor costs is added in Model 5 (Table 4.4b). The 
coefficient is not significant and does not support Hypothesis 4.2a. Model 6 tests 
Hypothesis 4.2b by introducing the variable residual network’s uncertainty of labor 
costs. The coefficient is negative and significant (log likelihood -820.58). The 
unpredictability of labor costs of the remaining locations seems to prevent divestment 
of the focal location. However, due to its strong correlation with residual network’s 
labor cost development it loses significance in the full model (Model 8). Model 7 
includes the interaction term of uncertainty of labor costs and contribution to network 
diversity, which effectuates a significant improvement of the log likelihood to -822.36. 
The interaction term is negative and significant, providing support for Hypothesis 4.2c. 
The opportunity to shift production between the focal location and other countries 
with opposite labor cost developments lowers the propensity to leave a country with 
uncertain labor costs. Since uncertainty of labor costs becomes significantly positive 
in Model 7 as well as in the full model, Hypothesis 2a, which predicts that the 
unpredictability of labor costs enforces divestment decisions, is partly supported. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
Besides the known factors of international divestment, benefits from operational 
flexibility appear to govern a firm’s decision to withdraw from a location. This 
chapter complements the findings of prior work that network size (Chung, Lu, & 
Beamish, 2008), labor cost growth, and host-country redundancy (Belderbos & Zou, 
2009) influence divestment decisions regarding operational flexibility. It shows that 
the effect of labor cost growth in the focal location is reduced by the ease of reducing 
its production capacity for the time being. Thus, the location will be available for 
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reverse labor cost movements in the future. The analysis further shows that labor cost 
uncertainty is acceptable if the focal location shows a labor cost development that is 
different from the developments in the residual network. Under these circumstances, 
the location provides the firm with operational flexibility. 
Previous studies mostly identified factors that determine the survival of single 
international affiliates. This literature, however, gives little attention to the flexibility 
value of these affiliates as part of an international production network. On the one 
hand, our study of the European production networks of German MNCs confirms 
those findings concerning GDP growth and political conditions (Benito, 1997) and 
concerning the share of investment in the foreign affiliate (Li, 1995; Ogasavara & 
Hoshino, 2008). Besides including these factors as indicators of subsidiary 
performance, we explicitly control for financial performance and find that it exerts a 
strong negative influence on divestment propensity, while the influences of the other 
factors remain stable. 
On the other hand, the concept of operational flexibility suggests viewing foreign 
affiliates not only as independent entities that serve local supply or demand markets 
but also as a set of interrelated units that enable the firm to react flexibly to changing 
cost conditions (Kogut, 1985). In this perspective, divestment decisions depend on 
cost developments both in the focal location and in the remaining locations (Belderbos 
& Zou, 2007). This chapter reveals that investors base their decision to completely 
withdraw from a host country on cost developments in the whole network of 
production facilities. It further suggests that rising and uncertain wages decrease the 
net present value of a production location, whereas they increase the flexibility value 
of a location if firms can easily adjust their local workforce and if the location 
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contributes to the heterogeneity of wage developments in the network. 
Investors who have to decide on international divestments may base their decisions on 
diverse information. Our analysis revealed that those decisions are not only driven by 
the most evident reason – the foreign investment’s financial performance – but also by 
the production location strategy of a firm. We find that labor cost characteristics of the 
focal location and the other locations of the production network are strong predictors 
for a firm’s international divestment decisions. When evaluating a country as a 
candidate for divestment, managers ought to consider the flexibility value of a 
location: They should take into account the rigidity of the local labor market as well as 
the location’s fit into the existing network’s wage developments, i. e. the location’s 
contribution to the heterogeneity of labor cost developments. Long-term oriented 
investors should not hastily withdraw from a host country when labor cost 
developments temporarily turn adverse if the foreign location provides the flexibility 
needed for an international production shifting strategy. Rather, they should keep the 
location in their portfolio since international cost conditions may change rapidly and 
the location might offer the potential for taking over production tasks from other 
countries. 
Since host country governments have an interest in keeping foreign investors in the 
country, the analysis also has political implications. First, labor markets should be 
flexible in order to benefit from the employment effect of foreign investors. 
Administrative and regulative obstacles to the dismissal of workers impose costs on 
investors who intend to adjust their workforce. If they cannot reduce capacity to the 
desired level, they are more likely to completely withdraw from the location. In 
contrast, if the host country government allows for temporary workforce reductions, 
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investors will stick to the location for later re-investments. Secondly, host country 
governments need to be aware that investors evaluate a country’s quality as a 
production location by its fit with other locations in the country portfolio, which is 
different for each investor. Efforts to influence labor cost developments, for example, 
tax concessions or subsidization of wages, are ineffective if investors base the 
decision to exit a host country on its ability to contribute to the operational flexibility 
of the network. 
Future research may build on the findings of this analysis and overcome its limitations, 
some of which are due to missing information in the anonymous dataset. Studies 
should incorporate more factors that have been examined by extant research into 
international divestment decisions. In the present data, we have no information on 
product diversification of the foreign subsidiary in relation to the parent company. 
Further, there is no distinction between greenfield investments and acquisitions, and 
no information on a parent firm’s or subsidiary’s competitive advantage, e. g. R&D or 
advertising intensity. Neither could we judge whether strategic motivations, other than 
production shifting, triggered the divestment decision. 
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5. PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF EXPANSION AND 
 CONTRACTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
 PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
5.1 Research context 
After analysing the conditions that induce firms to reconfigure their international 
production network through adding new or withdrawing existing locations from the 
portfolio, we now want to investigate the factors that determine the success of 
restructuring decisions that are based on operational flexibility. Improved efficiency 
of the international production network will lead to a better performance in the long-
run (Buckley & Casson, 1998). However, it is unclear whether a long-term oriented 
reconfiguration of a portfolio of locations will also lead to an increase in performance 
in the short-run. Restructuring involves massive capacity decisions which 
immediately cause costs, while the benefits may not deliver performance 
improvements until a certain period of time has passed (Bergh, 1998). When firms 
establish an international production network in order to exploit operational flexibility, 
the performance effects of restructuring depend on the changed flexibility 
characteristics of the network as a whole. Improved conditions for shifting capacities 
within the network allow more efficient exploitation of operational flexibility and, 
therefore, might reveal positive performance effects of the restructuring even in the 
short-run. This chapter seeks to examine whether positive effects of international 
restructuring decisions, due to improved flexibility characteristics within a production 
network, can immediately outweigh the costs of restructuring. 
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Empirical studies that investigate the performance effects of an international network 
configuration that provides operational flexibility have mainly employed the number 
of host countries (breadth of internationalization) to capture the potential for shifting 
activities across borders. Maintaining several subsidiaries in one host country, 
however, creates coordination costs for each site, while there is no additional 
alternative for shifting capacity. Hence, studies find that firms that maximize breadth 
rather than depth (concentration of subsidiaries in few host countries) have a higher 
market valuation than their domestic peers or firms with alternative configurations 
(Allen & Pantzalis, 1996; Lee & Makhija, 2009; Tang & Tikoo, 1999). The stock 
market seems to favor network configurations that offer more flexibility to shift 
production capacities across borders. Those studies take a static view on the benefits 
of an international network configuration. However, MNCs are faced with the need to 
restructure their international portfolio in order to obtain optimal conditions for 
shifting capacities. That raises the question of potential performance outcomes of a 
network reconfiguration. 
Firms must regularly confront decisions on restructuring their activities. Research has 
delivered a broad array of results concerning the determinants and outcomes of 
organizational, financial, and portfolio restructuring decisions (Bowman & Singh, 
1993). While the stock market immediately reacts positively to restructuring decisions 
if they seem to be an appropriate means to respond to performance declines (Byerly, 
Lamont, & Keasler, 2003; Denis & Kruse, 2000), effects on financial performance 
might at first be negative before they turn positive (Kang & Shivdasani, 1997). 
Insights into the performance outcomes of restructuring an international portfolio 
through integrating new or leaving foreign locations are missing to date. 
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This analysis aims to make some progress in that direction by investigating the 
performance effects of firms’ international restructuring activities. Building on the 
concept of operational flexibility, we want to clarify whether international 
reconfiguration decisions that enhance the flexibility to shift resources across the 
locations of a multinational production network can outweigh the costs of 
restructuring in the short-run. Flexibility to shift activities is offered by different 
characteristics of the production network. Besides the opportunity to shift capacities, 
the costs of altering production processes as well as the costs of transferring 
intermediate and final goods across borders within the network determine the 
efficiency of exploiting operational flexibility. The analysis complements existing 
research that considers performance outcomes of international network configurations 
in a static view as well as findings regarding the performance effects of a firm’s 
restructuring decisions. 
In the next section we build a model that incorporates the flexibility characteristics of 
a multinational production network that influence the performance outcomes of 
reconfiguring this network through host country entries and exits. The third section 
describes the empirical research design before the results of the econometric analysis 
are presented in section four. In the last section the results are discussed. 
 
5.2 Theoretical development 
Changing external conditions confront firms with the need to regularly revise their 
activities and to restructure them if necessary. On the organizational level, they may 
change the internal organization structure to increase efficiency of management 
teams; on the financial level, the capital structure can be changed, for example, 
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through buying back stock from equity investors; on the portfolio level, lines of 
businesses may be acquired or divested (Bowman & Singh, 1993). The performance 
outcomes of international investment and divestment decisions, as part of portfolio 
restructuring, are not unambiguous (Wu & Delios, 2009). Whereas portfolio 
restructuring decisions based on rational long-term strategy development are expected 
to show positive performance effects after a certain period of time (Chang, 1996), they 
incur costs in the moment when they are implemented. 
Heugens and Schenk (2004) identify three groups of forces that inhibit organizational 
change and impede corporate restructuring. Firstly, organizations have a distinctive 
competence for producing complex products or services and have specialized 
departments for recording how resources have been used as well as for reconstructing 
sequences of decisions (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). These firm characteristics can 
lead to a loss of efficiency in the moment of restructuring. Secondly, organizations are 
influenced by institutions that structure and regulate the operating environment 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Governmental and industry regulations as well as the 
educational system are examples of institutions that determine the activities of a firm. 
When organizations engage in radical strategic change, the discrepancy between their 
actual structure and the institutionally prescribed ideal can lead to a loss of legitimacy 
and reputation in the short-run. Thirdly, organizations are influenced by external 
stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The relationships with stakeholders, for 
example, customers, are a specific combination of the involved parties. Stakeholder 
and firm can influence each other, in contrast to institutions such as public authorities, 
which influence the firm. A restructuring decision might disturb a more or less stable 
equilibrium between a firm and its external stakeholders in the short-run. The need to 
maintain this equilibrium can represent an obstacle to far-reaching change. 
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These three groups of forces that impede restructuring are most pronounced in the 
moment of reorganization and will ease in the course of time. If new production 
locations are integrated into a network, organizational routines will change and new 
relationships to institutions and stakeholders will have to be established. If locations 
are withdrawn from the portfolio, the organizational structure of the remaining 
network will have to be revised to compensate for the divested part. Further, leaving 
host countries might also negatively impact the relations to institutions and 
stakeholders in other foreign locations. We expect that the more radical the decisions 
on restructuring an international portfolio of production locations, the stronger will be 
their negative impacts on performance of an MNC in the moment when they are 
implemented. 
Hypothesis 5.1: The more an international production network is 
reconfigured, the lower will be its performance in the short-run. 
An MNC that maintains an international production network in order to exploit the 
potential of operational flexibility has to ensure that the network offers the flexibility 
needed to shift labor capacities. If there is potential to improve the flexibility to shift 
capacity, the MNC should change the network configuration. The flexibility to react 
to changing labor costs within the production network is determined by three 
characteristics: the opportunity to react to cost changes, the costs that are associated 
with altering production processes within the network, and the costs that are 
associated with transferring intermediate and final goods across the locations of the 
network. MNCs that restructure their international production network in order to 
improve the three flexibility characteristics will have more potential to benefit from 
the exploitation of operational flexibility. 
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The opportunity to react to labor cost developments is contingent on the 
interdependencies of cost developments within all locations of the network. Chung et 
al. (2010) demonstrate that MNCs do not shift production internationally if macro-
economic conditions among the foreign locations are redundant, as environments 
change in parallel. Belderbos and Zou (2009) show that multinational portfolio 
redundancy, measured as the correlation of exchange rates between an affiliate’s host 
country and the other countries of the production network, leads to a higher propensity 
to withdraw from that location. Therefore, flexibility is higher when there is diversity 
of labor cost developments across the locations, that is, growth rates of wages 
fluctuate in different directions in the individual countries of the production network. 
We expect that the more a network configuration is altered, the more an increased 
diversity of cost developments can offset the costs that are associated with the 
reconfiguration of a production network. 
Hypothesis 5.2: The more an international production network is 
reconfigured, the more firms will benefit from increased diversity of labor 
cost developments within the network in the short-run. 
The costs associated with altering production processes are determined by the costs 
for quantitative and qualitative adjustments of workforce within the network. The 
costs of increasing and reducing the number of employees in a location – quantitative 
adjustment – depend on the legal provisions of the local labor market (Pull, 2008). 
Countries exhibit different intensities of labor market regulations and thus impose 
different costs on firms that adjust labor capacity in a location (World Bank, 2009). 
When enlarging capacity, firms may face prohibition or maximum duration of fixed-
term contracts for new employees. Countries also differ in relation to restrictions of 
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night and weekend work, maximum hours of the working week, and overtime. When 
dismissing workers, different costs occur due to notification and approval 
requirements, severance payments, or priority rules. Higher institutional regulations 
regarding the quantitative adjustment of labor capacity will lead to higher costs of 
altering the multinational production process. Therefore, we expect that the more 
MNCs restructure their international production network in a way that quantitative 
adjustments of labor capacity become less expensive, the more they will benefit from 
restructuring immediately. 
Hypothesis 5.3a: The more an international production network is 
reconfigured, the more firms will benefit from increased labor market 
flexibility within the network in the short-run. 
Besides costs of quantitative adjustments of labor capacity within a network, shifting 
of capacity generates costs of qualitative adjustments in the individual locations. A 
well-qualified workforce may have fewer problems in coping with changing 
requirements when firms alter production outputs or processes in the focal location 
(Geishecker, Goerg, & Munch, 2010; Pull, 2008). When capacity in a location is 
increased, new (untrained) workers have to be hired. When capacity in a location is 
reduced, the remaining workers have to fulfill other tasks to maintain the production 
process on a lower scale. Workers that are less versatile generate costs for additional 
trainings in the individual plants and higher costs relating to deficient products. The 
more often the MNC alters its production schedule within the network of production 
locations, the more costs may occur when the workforce has not sufficient ability to 
react flexibly to changing demands within the production process. We expect that the 
more the international configuration is changed, the better firms are able to benefit 
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from a more versatile workforce within the network. 
Hypothesis 5.3b: The more an international production network is 
reconfigured, the more firms will benefit from increased flexibility of labor 
force within the network in the short-run. 
Altering production processes across foreign locations due to changed cost conditions 
creates a high intrafirm flows of goods. Raw materials and preliminary goods have to 
be transferred to the locations of the production system where they are needed for 
further processing; finished products have to be transferred from countries where they 
have been manufactured to countries where the customers are. Besides costs of 
transportation, trade across borders creates costs due to tariffs and bureaucratic 
hurdles at borders (World Bank, 2009). The overall costs associated with importing or 
exporting goods differ across countries, even with the rising emergence of tariff 
agreements between countries, because of different regulations concerning required 
documents and procedures when goods pass the national border. We expect that the 
more the network is restructured, the more firms can benefit from lower costs of 
trading across borders. Figure 5.1 summarizes the proposed influences of the five 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 5.4: The more an international production network is 
reconfigured, the more firms will benefit from increased ease of trade 
within the network in the short-run. 
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Network
reconfiguration
∆ Labor market
flexibility ∆ Performance∆ Diversity of laborcost developments ∆ Labor force
flexibility
(H 5.2)+
-
∆ Ease of trade
Opportunity to shift
Costs of altering 
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(H 5.1)
(H 5.3a, 5.3b)
Costs of transferring
goods
(H 5.4)
+
+
Figure 5.1: Illustration of hypotheses on performance effects of network 
reconfiguration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Empirical methods 
5.3.1 Data 
We test the hypotheses on firm-level data of German MNCs. The Central Bank of 
Germany maintains a database that comprises anonymous information about all 
foreign direct investment objects of German parent firms above a balance sheet total 
of € 3 million. The reports include balance sheets, the stock of foreign direct 
investment and other characteristics of the foreign affiliates and parent firm. They are 
available as panel data on an annual basis. For this study, we use definitive figures 
between 2002 and 2006 and preliminary figures from 2007. Besides firm-level data, 
we included country-level data of the World Bank, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), and the World Economic Forum. 
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Since investors and investment objects are classified by industry codes, we are able to 
filter out the production affiliates of the parent firms. Because of transportation and 
coordination costs, a high physical distance will impede a firm’s exploitation of the 
potential of production shifting (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). In common with existing 
research on capacity adjustments within an international network of subsidiaries 
(Belderbos & Zou, 2007), we limit the analysis of production affiliates to one 
geographical region. We center on Europe as production location since it is the most 
relevant target region of German foreign direct investment, accounting for 56 % of the 
foreign production. The second reason that makes Europe an appropriate empirical 
environment is that MNCs evaluate factor costs in the currency of their home country, 
while exchange rate fluctuations superimpose international factor cost movements. In 
European production networks, exchange rate fluctuations play a minor role due to the 
strong influence of the euro as common currency (European Central Bank, 2007). 
The panel consists of 631 parent firms that are under observation for at least two 
consecutive years, and on average for 3.96 years (2498 firm years). Since international 
production shifting requires at least one alternative location, we incorporated investors 
only that maintain production affiliates in two foreign markets as a minimum. We 
excluded affiliates that reported zero employees or sales and outliers with a return on 
sales below -1000 % or above 1000 %. After aggregation of all production affiliates 
an investor holds in a country, we track restructuring decisions by identifying host 
country entries and exits of a firm in an individual year. Country entries were defined 
if a new country appears in the portfolio and stays in it for at least one subsequent year. 
Country exits are assumed to occur when a country is not in the firm’s portfolio 
anymore in the subsequent year. Table 5.1 gives a breakdown of the number of entries 
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and exits that occurred in the observation period. All numbers referring to less than 
four observations are concealed due to confidentiality. 
 
Table 5.1: Number of entries and exits per host country 
Country Number of entries Number of exits 
Austria 37 58 
Belgium 39 36 
Bulgaria 7 5 
Czech Republic 54 42 
Denmark 5 12 
Estonia < 4 < 4 
Finland 13 10 
France 76 93 
Greece 5 7 
Hungary 37 38 
Ireland 12 14 
Italy 57 78 
Kazakhstan 5 < 4 
Latvia < 4 < 4 
Moldova < 4 < 4 
Netherlands 33 44 
Norway 14 11 
Portugal 19 23 
Russian Federation 30 11 
Slovak Republic 24 18 
Spain 49 78 
Sweden 24 19 
Switzerland 28 33 
Turkey 28 17 
Ukraine 9 < 4 
United Kingdom 59 77 
Total 666 731 
 
5.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variable 
The profitability effect of restructuring decisions within the international production 
network is measured by figures that are specific to that network. As return on sales is 
a commonly used indicator of profitability in international business research (Capar & 
Kotabe, 2003; Li, 2001; Qian, Li, Li, & Qian, 2008), we calculate the joint return 
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on sales over all foreign production affiliates of an MNC in a year and subtract the 
return on sales of the previous year as measure of change in performance. 
 
Independent variables 
To separate performance effects that stem from a country-specific evolution of the 
factors that impact the flexibility of production shifting from those that evolve from 
restructuring the international network, we build interaction terms that link 
restructuring decisions to the change in the particular network properties. The variable 
network reconfiguration sizes the extent of restructuring the international network 
through host country entries and exits relative to the size of the international network 
(as number of host countries) in a particular year. The variables network expansion 
and network contraction capture the relative extent of network restructuring regarding 
host country entries and exits separately. 
The variable change in diversity of labor costs shall reflect changes of heterogeneity 
of labor cost developments within the production network. Labor cost developments 
in foreign locations were taken from ILO’s Key Indicators of the Labour Market 
(KILM) databank, 6th edition (2009). We use the real manufacturing wage index as a 
basis, which is the nominal wages index corrected for changes in purchasing power 
measured by the consumer price index (100 * nominal wage index/consumer price 
index). We subtract the wage index of the previous year from the wage index of the 
present year to obtain annual growth rates. We then calculate the variance in real 
manufacturing wage growth rates across the respective set of host countries in a year 
and subtract the variance of the previous year. Positive values indicate that the 
heterogeneity of labor cost developments has become higher. 
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The World Bank publishes the annual survey “Doing Business” that reports on 
business regulations and the protection of property rights as well as their effects on 
businesses in 183 economies (World Bank, 2009). The data are useful for foreign 
investors to evaluate countries as investment targets and are often employed as 
indicators in empirical studies (e.g., Atanassov & Kim, 2009; Botero et al., 2004). In 
particular, the reports include information on national labor market regulations, which 
are provided by local lawyers and public officials in each country. We draw on the 
“employing workers” index which captures regulations concerning hiring workers, 
working time, and dismissing employees. In order to obtain a measure of flexibility, 
we inverted the figures of each country and year and subtracted the average value 
across the locations of the network of the previous year from the current year in order 
to measure change in flexibility of labor market. 
The versatility of the workforce is specific in particular foreign locations. Whereas 
firms may employ trainings and working routines across their foreign affiliates, the 
ability of the employees to adapt to changing requirements in the production process 
is contingent on the quality of the educational and vocational training system in a 
country (Pull, 2008). As in extant research (Geishecker, Goerg, & Munch, 2010; 
Herrmann, 2008), we draw on the yearly gross tertiary enrollment rates (source: 
World Economic Forum) to account for the quality of the educational system of a 
country. We calculated the average over the foreign locations of an MNC and 
subtracted the value of the previous year to obtain the variable change in flexibility of 
labor force.  
In the European setting, tariffs or import restrictions as sources for costs of trading 
across borders are of minor importance due to the common market. However, the 
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costs for documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, 
terminal handling charges, and domestic transport differ considerably across the 
European countries (e. g. Belgium being twice as costly as Finland). We draw on 
figures from “Doing Business” surveys of the World Bank to account for those costs. 
Taking the mean costs that are associated with import and export of a 20-foot 
container in U.S. dollars, we calculated the average inverted costs across all locations 
in a year and subtracted the average inverted costs of the previous year to obtain the 
variable change in ease of trade. Positive values indicate that the transfer of goods 
across the locations of a network has become less costly whereas negative values 
point to higher costs of trading. 
 
Control variables 
Changes in performance from one year to the next may also occur due to productivity 
changes within the production network. We control for change in productivity by the 
sales of the network’s subsidiaries relative to the number of employees. Further, we 
draw again on ILO’s real manufacturing wage index as a basis for calculating wage 
growth rates in each foreign location before we compute the mean across all 
production locations in a particular year and subtract the mean for the previous year to 
control for change in wage growth. Time dummies control for overall external effects 
in the individual years of observation. Table 5.2 summarizes the measurement and 
descriptive statistics of the employed variables. All minimum and maximum values of 
firm-level variables refer to the average of highest and lowest three observations due 
to confidentiality policies. 
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Table 5.2: Variables measurement and descriptive statistics 
Name Description Mean StdDev Min Max 
change in 
performance 
(Return on sales across foreign locations)t - 
(return on sales across foreign locations)t-1 
-9.22E-6 0.15 -2.05 1.63 
network 
reconfiguration 
Number of exits and entries / number of 
countries 0.11 0.23 0 1 
network expansion Number of entries / number of countries 0.04 0.12 0 0.78 
network contraction Number of exits / number of countries 0.07 0.20 0 1 
change in ease of 
trade  
(Inverted average costs of importing and 
exporting across foreign locations)t - (inverted 
average costs of importing and exporting 
across foreign locations)t-1 
-13.15 85.17 -682.8 627.9 
change in flexibility of 
labor force 
(Average tertiary enrollment rate across 
foreign locations)t - (average tertiary 
enrollment rate across foreign locations)t-1 
2.09 3.85 -15.80 26.85 
change in flexibility of 
labor market  
(Average inverted “Employing workers” index 
across foreign locations)t - (average inverted 
“Employing workers” index across foreign 
locations)t-1 
-0.11 3.74 -22.83 24.50 
change in diversity of 
labor costs  
(Variance of labor cost developments across 
foreign locations)t - (variance of labor cost 
developments across foreign locations)t-1 
96.49 306.1 -1539 3330 
change in productivity  
(Sales in foreign locations / number of 
employees in foreign locations)t - (sales in 
foreign locations / number of employees in 
foreign locations)t-1 
12.55 108.1 -1354 1450 
change in wage 
growth  
(Average wage growth across foreign 
locations)t - (average wage growth across 
foreign locations)t-1 
0.77 5.39 -30.90 41.44 
Number of observations: 2498  
 
To analyse our data, we employ an econometric panel technique. In the last decades, 
there has been increasing economic and financial integration of countries and financial 
entities, which imply strong interdependencies between cross-sectional units. Firms 
are likely to respond similarly due to unobserved components such as common social 
norms, neighborhood effects, or herd behavior (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). A 
growing body of literature concludes that panel-data models are likely to exhibit 
substantial cross-sectional dependence in the errors (e.g., Baltagi, 2005), which leads 
to rejection of the assumption of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
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error terms. We performed the cross-sectional dependence test developed by Pesaran 
(2004) and found that the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence is strongly 
rejected. Further a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test (Breusch & Pagan, 1979; Cook 
& Weisberg, 1983) indicated the existence of heteroskedasticity of error terms. We 
therefore use a Prais-Winsten feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation 
that allows for panel-specific autocorrelation as well as heteroskedastic and 
contemporaneously correlated disturbances across panels (Wooldridge, 2003). 
 
5.4 Results 
The correlation matrix in Table 5.3 reveals that the variables are largely independent 
of each other. The variance inflation factors are close to one (mean: 1.09) indicating 
low levels of multicollinearity. 
Table 5.4 presents the regression results. Model 1 is the base model; none of the 
control variables reveals a significant coefficient, suggesting that they do not exert an 
impact on change in performance. As for the four variables that account for changes 
of factors that impact the flexibility of production shifting, their developments from 
one year to the other do not seem to impact performance changes, except in the case 
of change in flexibility of labor market, which reveals positive performance effects. 
Since not all firms exploit the flexibility potential of their international production 
network, improved flexibility characteristics seem not to have positive performance 
outcomes per se. Rather, only firms that do exploit the potential of production shifting, 
which might be identified by the motivation to improve the flexibility through 
network reconfiguration, are likely to benefit from better conditions for shifting 
production capacities. 
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Table 5.3: Correlation matrix and variance inflation factors 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 VIF 
1 change in performance 1         
2 network reconfiguration -0.05 1       1.01 
3 change in ease of trade  -0.01 0.04 1      1.09 
4 
change in 
flexibility of 
labor force 
0.01 0.03 0.06 1     1.11 
5 
change in 
flexibility of 
labor market  
0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.19 1    1.04 
6 
change in 
diversity of 
labor costs  
-0.01 -0.03 -0.13 0.07 -0.03 1   1.11 
7 change in productivity  0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 1  1.00 
8 change in wage growth  -0.02 -0.02 -0.28 -0.22 0.05 0.28 0.00 1 1.24 
Number of observations: 2498  
 
The model variables are introduced throughout Models 2 to 6 in a stepwise manner. 
The variable network reconfiguration has a negative and highly significant coefficient 
(Model 2), which delivers support for our first hypothesis. It indicates that the more 
the network configuration is altered in relation to the network size, the higher will be 
the costs, leading immediately to a decrease of performance within in the portfolio. 
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Table 5.4: Prais Winsten regression on performance effects of network 
reconfiguration 
change in performance  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
network reconfiguration 
X change in ease of 
trade 
      0.0003***(0.0001) 
 0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
network reconfiguration 
X change in flexibility of 
labor force 
     0.0089*** (0.0027)  
 0.0076*** 
(0.0027) 
network reconfiguration 
X change in flexibility of 
labor market 
    0.0003 (0.0025)   
 0.0012 
(0.0026) 
network reconfiguration 
X change in diversity of 
labor costs 
   0.0002***(0.0001)    
 0.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
network reconfiguration  -0.0430***(0.0127) 
-0.0391***
(0.0123) 
-0.0428***
(0.0128) 
-0.0432*** 
(0.0127) 
-0.0452***
(0.0129) 
-0.0414***
(0.0125) 
change in ease of trade  -7.27E-7 (2.92E-5) 
-7.41E-6 
(2.92E-5) 
 8.70E-6 
(2.89E-5) 
-7.56E-6 
(2.92E-5) 
-9.96E-6 
(2.86E-5) 
-3.95E-5 
(2.86E-5) 
-3.41E-5 
(2.84E-5) 
change in flexibility of 
labor force 
 0.0010 
(0.0008) 
 0.0009 
(0.0008) 
 0.0009 
(0.0008) 
 0.0008 
(0.0008) 
-0.0001 
(0.0007) 
 0.0008 
(0.0008) 
-9.95E-5 
(0.0007) 
change in flexibility of 
labor market  
 0.0014** 
(0.0007) 
 0.0014** 
(0.0007) 
 0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
 0.0013* 
(0.0008) 
 0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
 0.0014* 
(0.0007) 
 0.0015* 
(0.0008) 
change in diversity of 
labor costs  
 1.92E-6 
(6.47E-6) 
 2.66E-6 
(6.48E-6) 
 1.03E-5 
(7.84E-6) 
 2.59E-6 
(6.46E-6) 
 2.66E-6 
(6.34E-6) 
 6.72E-7 
(6.56E-6) 
 8.35E-6 
(7.83E-6) 
change in productivity  1.26E-5 (1.62E-5) 
 6.49E-6 
(1.62E-5) 
 7.00E-6 
(1.62E-5) 
 6.28E-6 
(1.62E-5) 
 1.02E-5 
(1.63E-5) 
 5.37E-6 
(1.64E-5) 
 8.13E-6 
(1.63E-5) 
change in wage growth  -0.0002 (0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-2.73E-5 
(0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
 0.0002 
(0.0005) 
Wald Chi2 22.38** 32.51*** 37.32*** 33.10*** 39.11*** 34.35*** 42.60*** 
Objects 631 631 631 631 631 631 631 
Estimation with time dummies; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; Standard errors in parentheses 
 
By building an interaction term of network reconfiguration and the individual 
variables that account for changes in the different factors influencing the efficiency of 
production shifting, we can ascribe the impact of changes of those factors to 
restructuring decisions. For interaction, the variables were centered around zero. 
Model 3 reveals support for Hypothesis 5.2 since the coefficient of the interaction 
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term of network reconfiguration and change in diversity of labor costs is positive and 
significant. The more the international production network is restructured, the more 
increased diversity of labor costs leads to opportunities for production shifting and 
increases the performance of the international activities. Model 4 introduces the 
interaction term of network reconfiguration and change in flexibility of labor market. 
Since it is insignificant, we do not find support for Hypothesis 5.3a. Restructuring 
decisions that create lower average costs for quantitative adjustments in the 
production process do not seem to outweigh the costs of reconfiguration in the short-
run. Hypothesis 5.3b is supported, as the significant and positive coefficient of the 
interaction of network reconfiguration and change in flexibility of labor force in 
Model 5 indicates. The more the international configuration is altered, the more firms 
can benefit from lower costs of qualitative adjustments within the production process. 
Model 6 tests Hypothesis 5.4 by introducing the interaction of network 
reconfiguration and change in ease of trade. The significant and positive coefficient 
supports the notion that decreased average costs of transferring goods across borders 
due to network reconfiguration lead to more efficiency of production shifting. 
Model 7 represents the full model, comprising all hypothesized performance effects of 
restructuring decisions and reveals that the results remain stable when the variables 
are tested together. 
As a second step, we want to clarify whether the hypothesized performance effects of 
restructuring decisions are different when decisions of network expansion and 
contraction are considered separately. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present regressions analogue 
to Table 5.4. In Table 5.5, network expansion is incorporated as a variable which 
indicates the extent to which the network has been enlarged by entering one or more 
new host countries. Again, the coefficients of the control variables are insignificant. 
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Network expansion has a significant negative coefficient (Model 8) which indicates 
that the more the network is enlarged in relation to its size, the lower will be 
performance within the network in the short-run. Hence, Hypothesis 5.1 is also 
supported when only host country entries are considered. 
 
Table 5.5: Prais Winsten regression on performance effects of network expansion 
change in performance  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
network expansion X 
change in ease of trade     
 0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
network expansion X 
change in flexibility of 
labor force 
    0.0091*** (0.0028)  
 0.0096*** 
(0.0030) 
network expansion X 
change in flexibility of 
labor market 
   0.0016 (0.0026)   
 0.0036 
(0.0029) 
network expansion X 
change in diversity of 
labor costs 
  0.0002** (0.0001)    
 0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
network expansion -0.0673*** (0.0220) 
-0.0701*** 
(0.0218) 
-0.0664*** 
(0.0221) 
-0.0794*** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0826*** 
(0.0221) 
-0.0706*** 
(0.0216) 
change in ease of trade   2.58E-6 (2.88E-5) 
 3.91E-5 
(2.87E-5) 
 2.73E-6 
(2.87E-5) 
 4.29E-06 
(2.91E-5) 
-1.68E-06 
(3.01E-5) 
-4.73E-6 
(3.10E-5) 
change in flexibility of 
labor force 
 0.0011 
(0.0008) 
 0.0005 
(0.0008) 
 0.0011 
(0.0008) 
-0.0001 
(0.0008) 
 0.0005 
(0.0008) 
-0.0002 
(0.0008) 
change in flexibility of 
labor market  
 0.0014* 
(0.0007) 
 0.0013* 
(0.0007) 
 0.0011 
(0.0009) 
 0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
 0.0013* 
(0.0007) 
 0.0010 
(0.0009) 
change in diversity of 
labor costs  
 8.83E-7 
(6.56E-6) 
 3.79E-6 
(6.77E-6) 
 1.05E-6 
(6.54E-6) 
 1.80E-6 
(6.47E-6) 
 1.43E-6 
(6.69E-6) 
 2.12E-6 
(6.57E-6) 
change in productivity  3.67E-6 (1.59E-5) 
 2.77E-6 
(1.62E-5) 
 3.89E-6 
(1.60E-5) 
 6.55E-6 
(1.59E-5) 
 1.10E-6 
(1.60E-5) 
 7.09E-6 
(1.59E-5) 
change in wage growth  -0.0002 (0.0005) 
-2.14E-5 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-4.35E-5 
(0.0005) 
-8.68E-5 
(0.0005) 
 7.54E-5 
(0.0005) 
Wald Chi2 34.46*** 40.10*** 35.09*** 42.96*** 38.15*** 45.69*** 
Objects 631 631 631 631 631 631 
Estimation with time dummies; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; Standard errors in parentheses 
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Corresponding to the effects of network reconfiguration, we also find support for 
Hypothesis 5.2 (Model 9), Hypothesis 5.3b (Model 11), and Hypothesis 5.4 
(Model 12). Hypothesis 5.3a has to be rejected when only network expansion is 
considered only (Model 10). In the full model (Model 13) the effects remain mostly 
stable; however, the interaction of network expansion and change in ease of trade 
slightly loses its significance. 
 
Table 5.6: Prais Winsten regression on performance effects of network contraction 
change in performance  Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
network contraction X 
change in ease of trade     
 0.0011*** 
(0.0003) 
 0.0012*** 
(0.0004) 
network contraction X 
change in flexibility of 
labor force 
    0.0080** (0.0040)  
 0.0018 
(0.0049) 
network contraction X 
change in flexibility of 
labor market 
  -0.0029 (0.0065)   
-0.0050 
(0.0070) 
network contraction X 
change in diversity of 
labor costs 
  0.0002** (0.0001)    
 0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
network contraction -0.0258* (0.0142) 
-0.0232* 
(0.0137) 
-0.0258* 
(0.0146) 
-0.0228 
(0.0144) 
-0.0342** 
(0.0151) 
-0.0318** 
(0.0159) 
change in ease of trade   2.85E-6 (2.90E-5) 
 4.38E-6 
(2.84E-5) 
-1.72E-6 
(2.91E-5) 
-4.58E-6 
(2.89E-5) 
 4.71E-5 
(3.41E-5) 
 4.48E-5 
(3.53E-5) 
change in flexibility of 
labor force 
 0.0009 
(0.0008) 
 0.0009 
(0.0008) 
 0.0009 
(0.0008) 
 0.0011 
(0.0008) 
 0.0007 
(0.0008) 
 0.0004 
(0.0009) 
change in flexibility of 
labor market  
 0.0014* 
(0.0007) 
 0.0015** 
(0.0007) 
 0.0013* 
(0.0007) 
 0.0014* 
(0.0007) 
 0.0012* 
(0.0007) 
 0.0012* 
(0.0007) 
change in diversity of 
labor costs  
 2.33E-6 
(6.51E-6) 
 7.88E-6 
(7.79E-6) 
 1.96E-6 
(6.38E-6) 
 2.13E-6 
(6.50E-6) 
 2.43E-6 
(6.53E-6) 
 6.65E-6 
(7.74E-6) 
change in productivity  1.15E-5 (1.62E-5) 
 1.23E-5 
(1.62E-5) 
 1.21E-5 
(1.60E-5) 
 1.03E-5 
(1.62E-5) 
 1.07E-5 
(1.64E-5) 
 1.23E-5 
(1.60E-5) 
change in wage growth  -0.0002 (0.0005) 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
 0.0003 
(0.0005) 
Wald Chi2 23.71** 25.66** 23.84** 25.99** 29.89*** 30.04** 
Objects 631 631 631 631 631 631 
Estimation with time dummies; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; Standard errors in parentheses 
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The results of the regression on changes in performance when only decisions of 
network contraction are considered are congruent to those of the two preceding 
regressions (Table 5.6): Hypothesis 5.1 is supported as the negative and significant 
coefficient of network contraction reveals (Model 14). The more the network 
configuration is altered through leaving host countries, the lower will be the 
performance in the remaining locations. Further, we find again support for 
Hypothesis 5.2 (Model 15), Hypothesis 5.3b (Model 17), and Hypothesis 5.4 
(Model 18), whereas Hypothesis 5.3a has to be rejected (Model 16). In the full model 
(Model 19), however, the interaction of network contraction and change in flexibility 
of labor force loses significance. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
The results of this chapter suggest that a reconfiguration of international production 
networks can increase performance of a firm’s international activities in the short-run. 
Whereas the costs of restructuring decisions rise with the extent of reconfiguration 
and decrease performance, a higher flexibility of international production shifting 
immediately outweighs the costs of restructuring. Flexibility to shift production 
capacity is determined by the opportunity to shift and by costs that occur when 
production processes are altered and goods transferred across borders. Our analysis 
revealed that country entries and exits that create a higher diversity of labor cost 
developments within a production network provide more opportunities to shift 
capacity. If restructuring induces higher average versatility of workforce and lower 
costs of importing and exporting goods, the costs of production shifting will be lower. 
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The results correspond to previous findings that stress the importance of operational 
flexibility as an influential factor of a firm’s performance (Miller & Reuer, 1998; 
Pantzalis, 2001; Thomas & Eden, 2004). Earlier studies found that the stock market 
favors international network configurations with a high number of host countries 
rather than a concentration of activities in few foreign markets (Allen & Pantzalis, 
1996; Lee & Makhija, 2009). Maximizing the number of foreign locations is assumed 
to offer more flexibility for shifting production capacities across borders. However, 
network characteristics that determine the flexibility of production shifting are 
influenced by factors that are volatile. Therefore, a multinational network of 
production locations has to be regularly revised and restructured in order to maintain 
operational flexibility. 
This chapter models the conditions that influence the performance effects of 
restructuring decisions in the short-run. International portfolio restructuring changes 
routines within the firm and relationships with institutions and stakeholders outside 
the firm (Heugens & Schenk, 2004). This interruption causes costs and leads to an 
immediate decline in performance, regardless of the type of restructuring. Both, 
entering new or withdrawing existing locations interrupts established routines and 
relationships in an integrated network of subsidiaries. However, rearranging an 
international production network may enhance the flexibility to exploit international 
cost differentials. MNCs can benefit from restructuring even in the short-run when the 
conditions for production shifting will be improved. 
Our empirical analysis adds to previous findings on performance effects of 
restructuring decisions. Whereas portfolio restructuring was found to enhance 
performance in the long-run (Bergh, 1998; Chang, 1996), it reveals no (Wu & Delios, 
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2009) or negative (Kang & Shivdasani, 1997) performance effects in the short-run. 
Insights into the financial consequences of portfolio restructuring through adding new 
or withdrawing existing foreign production locations were missing until now. Further, 
our findings reveal that MNCs, that obtain more flexibility through restructuring, can 
immediately benefit from an international network reconfiguration. A higher diversity 
of labor cost developments was found to provide more opportunities for shifting 
capacity, which complements previous findings concerning the impact of diversity of 
exchange rate movements within an international network (Belderbos & Zou, 2009; 
Chung et al., 2010). Since production networks exert specific costs for exploiting 
operational flexibility (Buckley & Casson, 1998), changed average cost conditions of 
international production shifting determine the performance outcomes of restructuring. 
Lower costs of qualitative adjustments within the production process and of 
transferring goods across borders positively impact performance, when they emerge 
from restructuring decisions. Lower costs of quantitative adjustments, however, do not 
seem to outweigh the costs of restructuring in the short-run. The sub-analyses of 
restructuring decisions differentiating country entries and exits substantiate these 
empirical findings. 
These results have important implications for investors who maintain an international 
production network and have to decide on restructuring it in order to enhance the 
benefits of operational flexibility. Long-term oriented restructuring decisions were 
found to have positive performance effects even in the short-run. Therefore, investors 
should not hesitate to restructure their international production network. The costs 
associated with restructuring, that may deter investors from entering new or 
withdrawing existing locations, can be immediately offset by the benefits of a higher 
flexibility. When evaluating countries as candidates for entry or exit, however, their 
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distinct fit within the existing portfolio should be considered. While absolute labor 
costs are an important factor in international in- and divestment decisions in general, 
their developments compared to the other locations of a network are decisive in 
obtaining positive performance effects of restructuring in the short-run. Other location 
characteristics, that immediately cause performance improvements of restructuring, 
are the versatility of workforce to cope with changing demands of altered 
manufacturing processes and the flexibility to transfer goods across the different sites 
of the network. An improvement of the average flexibility to quantitatively adjust 
production capacity, however, was not found to become performance effective in the 
moment of reconfiguration. 
The analysis also delivers useful implications for host country governments, which 
have an interest in attracting new and keeping existing foreign investors in the country. 
MNCs that maintain an international production network in order to exploit 
operational flexibility will restructure this network according to changing external 
conditions that impact the efficiency of production shifting. If entering or leaving 
countries enhances the average flexibility to shift production capacity within a 
network, performance will be improved. Since those performance improvements even 
appear in the short-run, it seems difficult for host country authorities to establish 
sustainable relations to foreign firms. Countries might aim at offering location-
specific flexibility, for example, through a well-qualified workforce, which is 
determined by the quality of the educational and vocational training system, or 
through low regulatory obstacles to import and export to be attractive as production 
location for a foreign investor. However, those location-specific characteristics are 
always evaluated by the investor in relation to alternative locations. Changing external 
conditions in all potential foreign locations motivate firms to regularly revise their 
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international configuration and to withdraw countries from the portfolio that have 
been chosen as production location before. Host country authorities must be aware 
that an MNC’s international location decision might be only of limited duration. 
Furthermore, host country governments need to consider of the likelihood that each 
investor evaluates the country’s appropriateness as a production location through its 
fit within the investor’s existing set of locations. Efforts to influence cost and 
flexibility characteristics are ineffective if investors base their decision to enter or exit 
a host country on its influence to operational flexibility of the established network. 
Therefore, it seems difficult for a single local authority to determine in- and 
divestment decisions that are based on a foreign investor’s multinational production 
configuration. 
The limitations of the analysis have to be kept in mind, when transferring its findings 
into directions for management and host country authorities. The short-term 
performance effects of restructuring decisions are determined by a number of 
characteristics within the MNC, which we were not able to observe. Managerial skills 
and corporate culture are important determinants of the success of integrating new or 
divesting foreign production subsidiaries. Further, the type of investment will 
influence the performance effects of restructuring. Acquired affiliates were found to 
be more complex and expensive to integrate into the MNC than greenfield 
investments. The anonymous dataset, however, does not allow controlling for these 
factors. 
Nevertheless, future international business research can build on the findings of the 
analysis to gain more insights on the performance outcomes of restructuring decisions 
that affect the efficiency of international production shifting. Studies building on 
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more fine-grained data sources such as management surveys may detect other factors 
that determine performance outcomes of restructuring an international production 
network. Furthermore, long-term performance effects and market-valuations of 
portfolio restructuring still have to be investigated. In the last chapter we will resume 
the findings of the preceding analyses of this study from an integrated perspective. 
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6. SUMMARIZING DISCUSSION 
A network of foreign production affiliates endows firms with operational flexibility to 
shift capacity internationally due to changed external cost conditions. If the current 
configuration of a multinational production network reveals efficiency deficits, MNCs 
have to restructure their international activities in order to be able to manufacture their 
products at lowest costs. In this study, we identified factors that urge firms to improve 
the efficiency of their multinational network by establishing new foreign production 
locations or by withdrawing existing production locations from the portfolio. 
Restructuring decisions that lead to a higher flexibility of capacity shifting were found 
to have positive performance effects. 
The results of this study deliver new insights into firms’ international production 
strategies. They complement existing research that investigates the conditions under 
which MNCs make use of operational flexibility and studies that analyse the 
performance effects of possessing operational flexibility. Comprehensive insights on 
the effects of operational flexibility on international portfolio restructuring decisions 
were missing to date. 
Our findings contain valuable implications for international investors. The study 
highlights a network perspective on international resource allocation decisions. 
Besides characteristics of the individual locations, that might be added to or 
abandoned from the portfolio, investors should consider their fit within a network of 
affiliates if they want to improve the efficiency of the international production system. 
Further, flexibility characteristics revealed to be as important factors as cost 
conditions for the efficiency of an international network. Firms that restructure their 
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multinational portfolio should account for the different flexibility aspects to the same 
extent as for current cost conditions in a location. 
Host country governments may consider the findings of this study when trying to 
attract new firms or keep foreign investors in the country. Institutional conditions such 
as regulation of the labor market are important factors that determine the efficiency of 
international production shifting. Host countries that improve those conditions offer 
more flexibility for multinational firms to exploit the potential of operational 
flexibility and secure the relative attractiveness of a location. However, public 
authorities have to be aware that MNCs might base their in- and divestment decisions 
not only on characteristics of the single location but on properties of the network as a 
whole. In that case, incentives for investors to make (further) investments should be 
individualized for the respective firm. Moreover, host countries must consider that 
MNCs are flexible in their location decisions; concessions that have been made by 
firms can become obsolete when external conditions change. Investment incentives 
for particular firms or the improvement of national conditions to meet the 
requirements of firms that are searching for the most efficient production locations 
might meet with only temporary success. Rather, the constant competition for foreign 
direct investment among national states can lead to an erosion of social institutions, 
e. g. on national labor markets. To preserve national interests, host country 
governments should think about trans-nationally agreed regulations that allow 
minimum standards regarding different legal business conditions. 
Future international business research can build on the findings of this study and 
overcome its limitations. Studies using more fine-grained data may detect an 
investor’s awareness of the flexibility potential underlying an international production 
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network and whether the international configuration technically allows capacity 
shifting as the different sites manufacture interchangeable outputs. Further, it has to be 
clarified to what extent managerial skills and organizational resources determine the 
exploitation and performance outcomes of operational flexibility within a firm. 
Subsequent studies may also advance the knowledge on allocation decisions based on 
operational flexibility by choosing empirical settings that are different from the 
European. Exchange rate movements are an important determinant of a multinational 
production network’s operational flexibility when there is no common or dominant 
currency. 
Our study revealed that the exploitation of international arbitrage and leverage 
opportunities is a main influencing factor of an MNC’s international resource 
allocation decisions. Beyond the interests of a single firm or host country, which can 
take advantage of efficiency attempts, the overall social and political consequences of 
an MNC’s exploitation of production flexibility have to be broadly discussed. 
Multinational firms that do not commit to corporate social responsibility guidelines 
may undermine social institutions through their bargaining power against national 
states. Those issues cannot be resolved by the discipline of international business 
research alone. Even though it is very difficult to meet the interests of every involved 
party, politics is required to debate potential solutions to counter MNCs that have 
become more powerful. As our study illustrated, MNCs act globally to achieve 
success. That is a strategy their negotiating partners from political side should adopt 
more consequently in order to strengthen their bargaining power. 
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